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Abstract 
 
Although institutional (moral) responsibility constitutes a critical 
component of contemporary international politics, it remains an 
uncharted field of inquiry in the field of International Relations. The 
primary objective of this dissertation is to put forward a theoretical 
argument upon which to build a theory of institutional responsibility, 
which will enable us to critically evaluate the UN‟s moral responsibility in 
the world‟s deadliest conflict since World War II, namely the conflict in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) which traces its origins in the 
“spill-over” of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. An analytical presentation 
of the background of the conflict and of the objectives and actions of the 
parties involved is vital in the effort to critically assess the UN‟s moral 
accountability in this conflict. Enquiries related to the UN moral 
responsibility, guarantee the efficient prevention of new holocausts or 
genocides in the future. Indeed the UN was primarily founded on the 
slogan “Never Again”. Thus the theoretical engagement in this field has 
some very tangible and humanitarian implications. The critical stance 
towards the UN, adopted in this dissertation, is a constructive critique 
which has as primary objective the more efficient functioning of the UN 
in the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Preliminary remarks 
A key rationale behind this analysis is the conviction that issues related 
to morality, ethics, and international normative theory, should be central 
in the study of International Politics. Hence, this dissertation is an effort 
directed towards this path. Many reasons justify why institutional 
(moral) responsibility constitutes a critical component of contemporary 
international politics. In the aftermath of World War II, 
Intergovernmental Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) and Multinational Corporations (MNCs) became central actors in 
international political life. Gradually the subject of politics was redefined. 
International politics is not any more exclusively a “struggle for power”; 
in fact it became a contest over legitimacy. As Claude Inis (1966:367) 
brilliantly stressed, in contemporary world politics “power [must] be 
converted into authority, (and) competence [must] be supported by 
jurisdiction”. The proliferation of institutions and organizations, over the 
last decades, indicates precisely this significance of legitimacy in 
international politics. The vast majority of contemporary economic, social 
and political problems, such as environmental degradation, global 
inequality, famine and security, to mention only a few, stem from large-
scale forces, such as globalization (Dobson, 2006:181), which make any 
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individual effort to redress these problems insufficient. Therefore the 
magnitude of these problems partly explains the reason why 
international institutions are so important today. Alternatively, as Larry 
May puts it: “there are simply too many harms that any person could 
have acted (with others) to prevent, to think an individual responsible for 
all the harms he or she failed to prevent” (1998:225).   
 
Uncharted field 
Despite this reality the scientific field of International Relations (IR) 
demonstrates a remarkable difficulty in recognizing entities, other than 
states, as central actors in international political life (Cumming, 
2003:28). This, in combination with the notable tendency of the majority 
of scholars towards abstention from any normative inquiry on issues 
related to morality and ethics leads to the conclusion that the concept of 
“institutional (moral) responsibility”, which is the topic of this work, 
remains an uncharted field of inquiry in IR (Erskine, 2003a:2). Equally 
striking poverty characterizes the literature of the present case-study 
and thus the vast bulk of the bibliography is supported by articles 
extracted from journals and reports from various NGO‟s, while some 
sources refer directly to original documents of the United Nations (UN).  
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The questions 
Although a significant part of this dissertation will be dedicated to 
theoretical reflections on the topic of institutional responsibility, this will 
not take place in an abstract manner. Instead, I will attempt to attest 
these theoretical perspectives with respect to the conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Various reasons validate my 
decision to employ this specific case-study. Initially, the war that the 
DRC “experienced” from the mid-1990s until 2003 is the world‟s 
deadliest conflict since World War II, with approximately 3.9 million 
casualties (Coghlan et al, 2006:49). Additionally, it has some other 
striking features such as long duration, high death-toll among civilians, 
the “collapse” of the Congolese state and the existence of various threats 
to international peace and security. This practically reveals that it 
encompasses almost all features of the new “complex humanitarian 
emergencies” that characterize interstate conflicts since the 1990s (Wolff, 
2006:50; Young, 2002:25). Finally, the transformation of the conflict into 
a continental war or “Africa‟s Great War”, encompassing the armed 
forces of eight neighbouring countries, makes this case-study 
particularly instructive. Hence the main question that emerges is: “To 
what extent is the UN morally responsible for the extraordinary levels of 
human suffering in the DRC?”. Equally important questions that come 
out, refer to the preconditions under which an institution can be 
accounted as a moral agent, that is, independent from its members. 
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The argumentation 
There are three main tenets upon which the primary question will be 
answered. Firstly, any assessment of the UN‟s moral responsibility in this 
conflict should commence by focusing on the aftermath of the Rwandan 
genocide, in 1994. In brief, the analysis will put forward an argument 
according to which the lack of a coherent policy, after the genocide by the 
UN, contributed to the “spill-over” of the genocide to neighbouring states 
and most notably to the DRC (then Zaire), with destabilizing effects for 
the country specifically, and for the region in general.  
Secondly, despite the obvious indications of recurrent violation of the 
principles of territorial integrity and state sovereignty of the DRC by its 
neighbouring countries, the UN did nothing to address and redress this 
problem. Two factors contributing to this violation were the continuous 
presence of foreign armed groups in the DRC and the illegal exploitation 
of the Congolese natural resources by local armed proxies of foreign 
countries. 
Thirdly, the analysis will argue that the UN is morally liable because the 
designated UN peacekeeping mission for the DRC (Mission de l‟ 
Organization des Nations Unies en Republique Democratique du Congo – 
MONUC) failed to overcome the chronic and structural problems of 
previous peacekeeping operations. Although the UN was cognizant of the 
inefficiency of the traditional peacekeeping approach in front of “complex 
humanitarian emergencies”, MONUC was not essentially differentiated 
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from traditional peacekeeping missions. Additionally, the UN should be 
held morally liable for its limited presence in such a vast country and in 
the context of a complex war. Finally, equally remarkable is the great 
disparity between the ambitious objectives declared in the Resolutions 
and the resources allocated to the peacekeeping mission. 
 
Structure 
The structure of this dissertation is the following: in the first chapter I 
will engage in the theoretical aspects of institutional responsibility. More 
explicitly, I will recruit some arguments from the relevant literature of 
ethics in order to set the preconditions under which an institution can be 
held morally responsible for its actions and omissions. Furthermore, I 
will attest these preconditions in the UN and will put forward an 
argument that the UN can be a moral agent and subsequently morally 
accountable for its actions and omissions. In chapter II of the 
dissertation, I will proceed to my case-study by sketching the 
background of the turmoil in the DRC, which is of crucial importance in 
order to comprehend the deeper causes of the conflict, the motives and 
the objectives of the parties while finally it elucidates the level of the UN 
moral accountability. Finally, Chapter III will be a synthesis of theory 
and practice. More specifically, I will attest my theoretical arguments by 
critically assessing the UN‟s moral responsibility in the context of the 
Congolese conflict. 
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                                   ************************** 
 
II. Institutional Responsibility and the UN. 
 
Preliminary Remarks 
Before proceeding to the definition of institutional moral responsibility 
and the analysis of the explicit preconditions for defining moral agency, it 
is necessary to make some introductory remarks. Initially, it should be 
stressed that although institutional responsibility constitutes a very 
important concept, the assignment of moral responsibility to collectivities 
should be very meticulously done and always according to clearly defined 
and logically coherent criteria. Otherwise we may find ourselves 
entrenched into populist and treacherous discourses such as blaming 
the entire German people as morally responsible for the Holocaust and 
thus easily create scapegoats (Erskine, 2003b:22; May and Hoffman, 
1991). This is an invalid effort if we have not previously proven that 
nations can be considered as moral agents.  
 
Equally, some other crucial explications should not be avoided. Firstly, 
there are many uses of the term responsibility in both daily life and 
scientific literature. A fundamental distinction is that between “causal” 
and “moral” responsibility. While causal or legal responsibility is 
assigned primarily through a legal system, the moral responsibility is 
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more closely related to the moral appraisal of an agent‟s conduct and 
intentions which derive from the “forum internum” (unwritten moral 
duties) (Feinberg, 1962:341; French, 1998a:38; Hart and Honore, 
1985:61; Miller, 2001:455). This dissertation will be mainly preoccupied 
with the later conception of responsibility.  
 
Similarly, there are various uses of the term “responsible”. We might say 
that someone is “responsible for” a certain duty, which indirectly implies 
an expectation to fulfil this duty in the future (Flores and Johnson, 
1983:538). In a similar manner, someone might be characterized as 
“responsible for” a certain action that already occurred and was causally 
responsible for it (Goodpaster and Matthews, 1982:133). The former 
conception of responsibility, meaning obligation, can be characterized as 
“a priori” or “prospective” responsibility, while the latter is known as “a 
posteriori” or “retrospective” accountability for actions or omissions 
(Erskine, 2003a:8; Kroslak, 2003:77). In this case-study the focus of 
attention will be on the notion of retrospective responsibility of the UN in 
the face of the humanitarian disaster in the DRC. Although this is a 
significant distinction, it should not be overstated, since the notion of 
responsibility, in both its retrospective and prospective form, has certain 
functions, the most important of which is the “exercise of moral pressure 
[…] [which] is part of an elaborate system by which society tries to 
protect itself against undesirable forms of behaviour” (Walsh, 1970:13). 
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Accordingly, these distinctions serve as mere analytical instruments for 
better comprehension and attribution of responsibilities. Furthermore, as 
Daniela Kroslak (2002:79) remarks “these two categories of responsibility 
(accountability and obligation) cannot be neatly separated because 
prospective responsibility (obligation) and retrospective responsibility 
(accountability) are inherently related to each other”.  
 
Critique 
Another key point requiring clarification is the doctrine of methodological 
individualism which constitutes the main critique to the idea that 
institutions, organizations and collectives in general can be morally 
accountable. According to this doctrine “a collectivity cannot act, and if it 
cannot act it cannot make any (moral) mistakes, since it is always the 
individual who acts” (Kroslak, 2002:86). It heralds that the responsibility 
is reducible to the individual members of this collectivity (Kroslak, 2003). 
Simply put, methodological individualism insists that collectivities 
possess “no soul to be damned and no body to be kicked” (Bovens, 
1998:53). In the same manner, Neo-realism adopts this view by declaring 
that international institutions are merely the sum of the member-states 
and as such they do not possess ontological independence. The next 
paragraphs will provide a response to this plausible critique. In this 
dissertation, the term “collective” or “institutional responsibility” 
corresponds to the “non-distributed responsibility of a specific group of 
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people structured in such a way that could not occur if the members 
were acting out of the group” (May, 1998:213). Hence, my overall 
objective is to prove that the group is morally responsible as an entity 
and not that the responsibility is distributed among the members 
composing this group (Erskine, 2003b:22). Obviously this does not 
suggest that members of the group are “off the moral hook” as long as 
there are degrees of responsibility and culpability (Baier, 1998:109; 
Erskine, 2004:26). This effort to establish the criteria for distributing 
responsibilities to institutions is one of the most essential objectives of 
this dissertation. 
 
Towards a theory of moral agency. 
As previously noted, the concept of “institutional moral responsibility”, in 
IR literature, is considerably under-theorised. Hence, my attempt to 
portray a blueprint for collective moral responsibility will primarily be 
supported by the sole noteworthy source in International Relations 
literature, namely the book “Can Institutions have Responsibilities?”, 
edited by Toni Erskine (2003). Simultaneously I will heavily draw 
arguments from other scientific disciplines which have developed similar 
inquiries, such as business ethics, and more precisely the work of Peter 
French, which may provide useful insights in this direction. 
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In order for someone to be considered as morally responsible for actions 
and omissions, she has to qualify as moral agent. Human beings are 
moral agents “par excellence”. Hence, at the onset it would be useful to 
elucidate the features that portray the moral agency of individuals in 
order to proceed to the second step, namely to establish a theory of 
institutional (moral) responsibility.  
 
An individual, in order to qualify as a moral agent, should possess the 
capacity to deliberate upon moral issues and be conscious of acting 
according to certain moral codes (Erskine, 2004:26; Held, 1970:475). 
Another important prerequisite for moral agency is the ability to act 
intentionally and rationally upon certain purposes, goals and interests 
that motivate a particular behaviour. Finally, a moral agent should enjoy 
a relative freedom to act in accordance with her intentions and objectives 
(Harbour, 2003:78). All these elements mentioned above are useful 
because they indicate the level of internal unity that an actor should 
possess in order to qualify as a moral agent. Consequently, it would not 
be an incoherent or logically flawed hypothesis to suggest that 
collectivities possessing these traits could be considered as moral agents 
and ultimately be held morally accountable for their actions and 
inactions (Copp, 1998).  
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The explication of Peter French‟s distinction between „aggregate‟ and 
„conglomerate‟ collectivities is useful. On the one hand an „aggregate 
collectivity‟ “is merely a collection of people. A change in an aggregate‟s 
membership will always entail a change in the identity of the collection” 
(French, 1998a:37). However, a collection of people with such a fluid 
identity cannot qualify as moral agent because it lacks internal unity, 
intentionality and capacity for moral deliberation which are „sine qua 
non‟ preconditions for moral agency (Held, 1970:475). Alternatively put, 
in such collectivities, the moral responsibility is distributive among the 
members composing the group and not on the group „per se‟. On the 
other hand, a “conglomerate collectivity is an organization of individuals 
such that its identity is not exhausted by the conjunction of the 
identities of the persons in the organization. […] A change in the specific 
persons associated in a conglomerate does not entail a corresponding 
change in the identity of the conglomerate” (French, 1998a: 44). 
According to French, the U.S. Army, the Red Cross, and the Democratic 
Party constitute examples of this type of collectivity. It is this 
„conglomerate‟ type of collectivities that possess the adequate features of 
moral agency and can be held morally accountable. 
 
Now that we have decoded the preconditions for moral agency, it is 
appropriate to simulate these preconditions to institutions. In this effort, 
Toni Erskine identifies that a collectivity, in order to qualify as moral 
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agent, should possess “an identity that is more than the sum of the 
identities of its constitutive parts and, therefore, does not rely on a 
determinate membership; a decision-making structure; an identity over 
time; and a conception of itself as a unit” (2003b: 24). Initially, it is of 
crucial importance that the institution under examination, is more that 
the sum of its constituent parts. Otherwise, any change in the 
membership will have a drastic impact on the independent deliberative 
capacity of the group and eventually it would be absurd to assign 
responsibilities to an entity that is inextricably dependent on its 
members. Consequently the kind of responsibility that preoccupies this 
dissertation should not be distributed to its members.  
 
Furthermore perhaps the most important criterion for a group to be 
considered as a candidate for moral agency is the existence of a coherent 
internal decision-making structure. This decisive factor reveals that the 
group under consideration has the sufficient capacity to deliberate. 
Consequently, this group possesses a “regulative control” over problems, 
indicating its capability to prevent events for which it might be 
responsible, from occurring (French, 1998b:254). Moreover, this 
decision-making structure allows the group to be an independent 
rational actor and to convert various individual actions into a unitary 
intentional corporate action (Corlett, 2001:578). More precisely, if a 
group has a “constitution” - that is a set of pre-existing formal or informal 
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rules which determine how the „inputs‟ of individual judgements are to 
be put together to generate group judgments as „outputs‟ - then we can 
plausibly argue that this group does possess a coherent decision-making 
structure and eventually qualifies as a moral agent (List and Pettit, 
2006:6).  
 
       INPUT                           CONSTITUTION                                     OUTPUT 
 
Individual                                            Set of Rules                                                      Collective Judgment 
 Judgments                       
 
                                                                                                                         source: List and Pettit, 2006:6 
 
 
 
Groups that do not hold any such “constitution”, such as a crowd or a 
mob, lack the capacity of corporate judgment and thus it is difficult to 
qualify as moral agents (ibid). It is absolutely necessary for any group to 
meet the criteria of moral agency, to posses “minimal rationality” which 
will signify its capability to deliberately pick a course of action or policy 
based on some internal evaluation of its objectives (Harbour, 2003:72).  
 
The UN as a Moral Agent? 
Taking into consideration the criteria mentioned above, can the UN be 
characterized as a moral agent? Can it be something more that the sum 
of the member-states that compose this organization? In other words, 
can the UN bear moral responsibility for its acts and omissions and, if 
this is so, under what circumstances? As in every aspect of politics, there 
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are no easy answers to such complex issues and thus we should abstain 
from uncritically adopting arguments. The UN constitutes a particularly 
“hard case” as the state-centric discourses that dominate the discipline 
of International Relations do not perceive international organizations as 
capable of possessing sufficient “ontological independence” to count as 
independent actors (Erskine, 2004:28; Barnett and Finnemore, 
1999:714). International organizations in general and the UN in 
particular, are perceived to be mere fora where states compete to 
promote their interests. These organizations cannot be considered as 
independent actors as long as they constitute a mere collection of 
divergent member-states.  
 
I am convinced that the UN, which can be likened as the “collective of the 
collectives”, does fulfil the preconditions mentioned above and eventually 
it should be considered as an independent moral agent. This is the 
deontological argument. From a historical perspective, the UN was 
established in the aftermath of World War II as a form of ensuring peace 
and preventing conflict as expressed by the doctrine of collective security. 
More precisely, it was founded on the general will to prevent in the future 
disastrous events similar to that of the holocaust. For an entity 
(organization) that traces its origins to such a normative context (“never 
again”), such as the UN, it would have been absurd to be incapable of 
moral action and deliberation. The time is ripe to take a further step and 
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attempt to attest the requirements for moral agency to the case of the 
UN.  
 
a. Corporate Identity. 
 Does the UN have an identity that is more than the sum of its 
constituents? In other words, it should firstly be examined whether the 
UN possess an (corporate) identity that cannot be reduced to the 
identities of its constituent member-states and subsequently be held 
morally accountable for its actions and omissions. Is it valid for the UN 
that “what it does is caused by its own wants and beliefs and not merely 
the wants and beliefs of certain powerful individuals” (Corlett, 
2001:580)?  
 
Initially, I would like to recruit a legal argument which might be useful. 
According to international law, an entity in order to be characterized as 
“person” should have an identity which is significantly distinct from its 
constituents. In fact the UN is a bearer of “International Legal 
Personality” which implies that legally, the UN does possess a distinct 
identity (Erskine, 2004:34). Although a legal argument, it is a significant 
point since it elucidates the distinct identity of the UN and secondly 
because even though “legally responsible” the UN as long as it can be an 
independent actor, its legal actions have moral implications and 
subsequently we can speak for the UN as a moral agent too. Another 
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equally plausible argument to be made at this point is based on the 
“bottom-up” approach of international organizations (such as the UN), 
according to which the organization through its “bureaucratic culture” 
possesses significant independence from the members that created this 
organization (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999:702). This argument is 
founded on the work of Max Weber concerning the functioning of 
bureaucratic mechanisms and was refined and attested on contemporary 
international organizations by Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore. 
According to this constructivist view, the rational and legal authority that 
international organizations embody provides them with the sufficient 
capacity to direct this authority towards pursuing objectives evaluated 
according to established priorities of the organization, thus securing a 
sufficient level of independence from their member-states (ibid). 
Furthermore, every organization develops a specific “bureaucratic 
culture” which to a large extent informs the discourses - formal or 
informal rules - that shape the appropriate type of policies towards the 
organizations‟ objectives (Barnett, 1997:555). Michael Barnett, who had a 
personal experience in the UN, verifies this “bottom-up” approach for 
this body (Barnett, 2002). More specifically, the bureaucrats (agents) in 
the UN, as in every organization, pursue not only the agenda imposed by 
their principals (states), but they are also affected by the “cultural 
landscape” which enable them to pursue their own bureaucratic 
agendas. Hence, this “cultural landscape” makes bureaucracy and 
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subsequently the organization itself an independent site of authority 
from its constituents. This is a very crucial argument because it implies 
that the UN is not merely a structure but a “purposive actor” and as 
such “it makes sense analytically to treat them (organizations) as 
ontologically independent (from the states that compose them)” (Barnett 
and Finnemore, 1999:726).  
 
It would be useful to draw on the literature of European Politics, in order 
to extend further the view that agents (bureaucrats) in international 
organizations are not mere instruments of their principals (states) and do 
not only pursue their principals‟ interests, but instead enjoy a significant 
level of independence. As it is widely known in the relevant literature, 
bureaucrats in the European Union (“eurocrats”), simultaneously with 
their primary duty to serve their principal‟s agenda, they develop their 
own preferences (Majone, 2001:110; Pollack, 1997:108). These 
“eurocrats” sometimes believe that the established objectives will be 
better performed by pursuing policies diverging from their principals‟ 
preferred policies (Tallberg, 2002:28). Furthermore, the most important 
threat for a principal (state) is the “bureaucratic drift” or “agency loss”, 
which is the situation where the agent pursues a significantly different 
policy than that for which she was originally delegated for (Hix, 2005:28-
29).  
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These points strengthen the argument that the “bottom-up” approach 
recruited by constructivists, is very useful in order to prove that 
international organisation through the “cultural landscape” have an 
identity which is significantly distinct from their member-states. This is 
also the case for the UN. 
 
In order to respond to the question if the UN is something more than the 
sum of its constituents, a convincing answer is that even though the 
persons holding the central positions in the UN change over time, the 
institutional status and identity of the UN remain unaffected. For 
example, although the UN Secretary General might change in due 
course, this does not indicate a change in the identity of the UN. Finally, 
there are some other symbols which clearly denote this corporate identity 
of the UN. The UN flag, the blue helmets in peacekeeping operations or 
even the international soil that hosts the headquarters of the 
organization in New York, all symbolically represent this distinct identity 
of the UN. 
 
b. Decision-making structure. 
Does the UN have a “constitution” which will convert diverse judgments 
and interests (input) of the individual member-states into a coherent 
“collective” output? The response to this question is of crucial importance 
since it will be an indication that the UN through this “internal 
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organization” (a) possesses moral deliberation; (b) surmounts individual 
interests; (c) represents the unity of the organization and (d) responds 
according to moral-rational evaluation (Erskine, 2004:26; French, 
1998a:45; List and Pettit, 2006:5). 
 
Firstly, the UN is a hierarchical organization which is founded on the 
“sovereign equality” of its member-states. More precisely, the UN Charter 
provides a full account of the functioning of the organization which is 
clarified in Chapter V (Erskine, 2004:30). Moreover, as I have previously 
mentioned there are not only formal, but also informal rules, shaped by 
the “cultural landscape” which are integrated in this “constitution” of the 
UN (Barnett, 2002:6). Thus we might validly argue that the UN possesses 
a decision-making structure that converts individual judgments into a 
“corporate” action. However, at this point a legitimate objection projected 
by Chris Brown, should be highlighted. According to Brown, the UN 
Security Council cannot act as an agent of the international society, 
because even if states pursue the common good for the “society of 
states”, at the same time they also pursue their own national interests 
(Brown, 2003). Hence the point that he puts forward here is that in case 
of a conflict between the common good and their own interests, the five 
permanent members of the Security Council, are legitimized to pursue 
the latter and most importantly as long as they are endowed with the 
veto provision, the decision-making procedure that we mentioned before, 
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vanishes (ibid). In such cases where veto is being exercised we cannot 
speak for a coherent decision-making procedure of the UN or that it 
constitutes a moral agent that is distinct from its constituents (Erskine, 
2004:36).  
 
Still, it can be argued that the UN is capable of moral deliberation. The 
important question that someone has to answer before proceeding to that 
conclusion is “can the UN respond to events and moral criticism by 
altering its intentions and behaviour?” (French, 1995:18). I think that the 
answer is confirmatory. This is obvious because the UN frequently feels 
obligated to justify its actions on ethical grounds, while there are various 
historical instances such as the case of Srebrenica massacre, in which 
the UN proved that is capable of introspection on past omissions and 
actions (Lang, 2003). This strengthens the argument that the UN, is 
capable of moral deliberation and consequently qualifies as a moral 
agent. 
 
c. Identity over time and conception of itself as unit. 
Finally, in order the UN to qualify as moral agent, it should possess an 
identity which is characterized by continuity. It must enjoy continuity 
irrespective of external events, while at the same time the UN should not 
be merely externally defined but instead have a consciousness of itself as 
a unit.  
 26 
 
At this point it might be useful to utilize an argument put forward by 
Toni Erskine which elucidates this point. According to Erskine, “the 
United Nations […] does possess an identity over time. Indeed, it exists 
prior to the crises to which it is charged with responding, and its 
existence outlives any response” (2004:31). Alternatively put, the UN was 
historically established in the aftermath of World War II with certain 
objectives, the most important of which were the prevention of violent 
conflicts, the promotion of peace and security. Thus it has a 
“prospective” responsibility to respond when a threat to these objectives 
arises. Otherwise it would have been a “coalition of the willing” by 
responding merely on certain stimuli (crises) within a specific time limit 
(ibid). Moreover, the UN possesses certain features that demark this 
continuity. More precisely, this organisation has always had the 
monopoly over legitimising international actors (Inis, 1966:367). In fact 
the UN has always had the monopoly over defining the actors that are 
accepted as members of the international society (Barnett, 1997:565). 
This has become an inherent characteristic of the UN identity and 
constitutes an indication of internal unity. 
 
Finally, another significant point derives from the empirical analysis of 
the UN activities over the last decade. More explicitly, the activities of the 
UN, in the post cold-war period, have been proliferated especially in 
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cases of “failed” or “collapsed” states (Megret and Hoffman, 2003:328). 
The UN developed not only peacekeeping missions but most significantly 
a net of administrative operations in conflict ravaged states, establishing 
a new trend referred as “post-conflict development” or “post-conflict 
reconstruction”. In such operations the UN has a key role because its 
agencies manage virtually every sector of public administration such as 
security, elections, tax collection, border control or even issuing 
identities. For some scholars this trend set the stage for a new model of 
sovereignty, which is not that much related to the notion of territory but 
most significantly with the “control” over population and responsibility 
(ibid). Therefore, it seems a reasonable argument to be made that these 
“proto-sovereign” competences of the UN in such missions verify the 
imprinted, in the collective memory, impression that the UN is “the” 
competent organization to respond to humanitarian crises, which has 
became inextricably linked to the identity of the organization. To 
summarize, the United Nation representing the “collective of the 
collectives” fulfils the criteria to qualify as a moral agent, and as such is 
responsible for its actions and inactions. More precisely, it has (a) a 
corporate identity which is more than the sum of its constituents; (b) a 
“constitution” or a coherent internal decision-making procedure; (c) a 
conception of itself as a unit and (d) an identity over time. 
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Defining Responsibility. 
At the final point of this section it is appropriate to briefly define the 
conditions under which a moral agent may be held as morally 
accountable for its actions or omissions. According to the two “negative” 
Aristotelian principles, an agent should not be ignorant of the facts 
surrounding her actions and secondly her actions should not be the 
result of undue force (Fischer and Ravizza, 1998; Slim, 1997:253; 
Zimmerman, 1997:411). In a similar way, the principle of “alternate 
possibilities” implies that: “a person is morally responsible for what he 
has done only if he could have done otherwise” (Copp, 1997:441). Hence 
it is of crucial importance that the agent fulfilled all the necessary 
preconditions in order to exercise her intentionality (Corlett, 2001). This 
dissertation is primarily preoccupied with moral responsibility, defined 
as the judgment of intentions and subsequently, it would have been an 
incoherent intellectual exercise to hold someone responsible for actions 
or inactions that she did not know or she was forced to pursue. 
According to one of the most important contributions in the field of 
responsibility, namely the notion of “faulty contribution” put forward by 
Joel Feinberg, an agent is morally accountable under certain 
preconditions. Initially the action or omission of this agent should 
causally contribute to the final (harmful) outcome, while simultaneously 
this action should be in some way „faulty‟. Finally, this faulty behaviour 
should affect - to some extent - the outcome (Feinberg, 1968:674). 
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To conclude, after defining the necessary preconditions for moral agency 
the analysis proceeded to the presentation of the argumentation 
according to which the United Nations can be a moral agent and 
therefore a subject of moral accountability. Finally it briefly portrayed the 
general prerequisites for holding a moral agent (and the UN) as morally 
responsible. The study now proceeds to the quest for moral responsibility 
of the UN in the case of the DRC‟s conflict. 
 
       ********************** 
 
III.  The Spill-Over of the Genocide.  
 
The Context 
The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is embedded in 
the wider context of the Great Lakes Crisis and thus it would have been 
analytically flawed to separate this conflict from the widespread 
turbulence in the region and more precisely from the conflicts in the 
neighbouring countries: Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Angola. Only by 
taking into account this regional context can one begin to comprehend 
the rationale behind key events, such as the “sudden” eruption of ethnic 
hatreds, genocidal forces, and the regional alliances (Lemarchant, 
2002:390; McCalpin, 2002:33). Any proper scientific explanation should 
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attempt to trace the origins of the current turmoil back to the legacy of 
colonialism. However, the aspirations of this dissertation are limited only 
to the description of the crisis in order to assess the moral accountability 
of the UN in the human disaster in the DRC. 
 
The Spill-Over: Refugee Camps 
The triggering factor of the conflict in the DRC is to be found in the 
immediate aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, in 1994. While most 
people feared that the coming “genocide”, after Rwanda, would take place 
in Burundi, this unpredictably erupted in Zaire (Prunier, 1997:194). The 
ending of the genocide in Rwanda resulted in an estimated flow of 2 
million Rwandan refugees, of Hutu origin, to neighbouring countries. 
Zaire hosted the vast majority of these refugees, which according to 
estimates fluctuated between 1.1 and 1.25 million (Emizet, 2000:163). 
That was the largest single exodus of refugees ever recorded, since in less 
than four months there was an estimated flow of 850.000 people solely in 
the Zairian city of Goma (Stockton, 1998:352). From July until October 
of 1994, a virulent cholera epidemic and dysentery killed approximately 
50.000 people (Lischer, 2005:79). That became known as the “cholera 
highway” (Polman, 2003:190). However, part of this stream of refugees 
comprised of the perpetrators who actively contributed to the Rwandan 
genocide (“genocidaires”). Most explicitly, it is estimated that 50.000 
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former soldiers of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and paramilitaries of 
the notorious group called “Interahamwe” fled into Zaire (Prunier, 1997).  
 
Although the ex-soldiers and paramilitaries represented only 6% of the 
refugees, they significantly affected the political situation in Zaire in two 
important ways. On the one hand, their presence in the Eastern 
provinces of the country and more precisely in the regions of North and 
South Kivu, tipped the demographic balance in favour of the Congolese of 
Rwandan origin and this eventually fuelled the competition between the 
refugees and the nationals over local resources and citizenship (Murison, 
2002:226; Ndikumana and Emizet, 2003:2). On the other hand, under 
the guidance of the defeated politico-military leadership, the radical Hutu 
refugees soon regrouped, and with the covert backing of Mobutu they 
were reorganized and rearmed with ultimate objective the preparation of 
new attacks against the Tutsi-led Rwandan regime (Csete, 2002:11; 
Haskin, 2005:77). The assaults against the Tutsi populations 
(“Banyamulenge”) in the Eastern parts of the country, by the resurrected 
“Interahamwe”, recalled the horrible memories of the genocide, which in 
combination with the Zairian policy of public intimidation of the 
Banyamulenge community with expulsion, heightened the security 
concerns of the Rwandan government (Rosemblum, 1997:201). These 
security concerns were reaffirmed when radical Hutu instigated cross-
border attacks against Rwanda from the refugee camps (Nest et al, 
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2006:25). Thus, Rwanda both in order to effectively respond to these 
security threats and to enhance the security of the fraternal community 
of Congolese Tutsi (Banyamulenge), began to assist the latter with arms. 
Moreover, in late 1996, and in reaction to the ongoing attacks from the 
refugee camps, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) entered into Zaire with 
primary objectives to disperse the refugee camps which threatened the 
security of the Rwandan state while additionally they attempted to 
capture the perpetrators of the genocide (Rosemblaum, 1997:200).  
 
The Rise of Kabila 
Almost immediately all domestic Zairian forces, motivated by the anti-
Mobutu sentiments, formed an alliance. In late 1996 the coalition of 
Congolese Tutsi; Lumumbists; Marxist guerillas and former Rwandan 
soldiers gave birth to the “Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la 
Liberation du Congo” (AFDL) with Laurent Desire Kabila as the leading 
figure  (DeVillers and Tshonda, 2002:403; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004:5). The 
intensification of the attacks against Rwanda convinced the Rwandan 
government that the time was ripe for a robust response. Therefore, 
during mid-November 1996, the RPA in cooperation with the Rwandan 
and Ugandan backed AFDL, attacked and dispersed the refugee camps 
triggering the largest refugee repatriation in history, estimated around 
500.000 to 700.000 returnees (Emizet, 2000:168; Lischer, 2005:95).  
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The destruction of the refugee camps signalled the sudden rise of Kabila 
but perhaps most importantly the entrance of foreign countries as key 
actors in the domestic political scene of the DRC (Lemarchant, 2000). 
Almost simultaneously, an internal struggle for the capture of Kinshasa 
took place. The hostility towards Mobutu and the preference for a new 
leadership in Zaire convinced the leaders of Rwanda, Uganda and Angola 
for the necessity of toppling Mobutu and subsequently supporting 
Kabila, the leader of the strongest internal rebel group (AFDL) (Dunn, 
2003:17). The disintegration of the Zairian state was so obvious that the 
march of the AFDL towards Kinshasa faced no resistance from the 
Zairian army (FAZ) and eventually Kabila ousted Mobutu in May 1997 
and was named president of the country (Thomson, 2000:46). One of his 
first actions was to rename the country from Zaire to Democratic 
Republic of Congo (Nest et al, 2006:23). 
   
The Origins of the Second War 
The alliance between Kabila and the coalition of neighbouring countries 
was short-lived though. Soon, Kabila established contacts with the Hutu 
ex-Interahamwe and those rebel groups fighting Uganda and Rwanda, in 
order to cultivate the ground for an impressive “volte face” and eventually 
liberate himself from his Ugandan and Rwandan patrons. This reversal 
took place in July 1998, when Kabila ordered all Rwandan officials to 
leave the country. This event triggered a chain of rebellions which 
 34 
resulted in a pogrom against the Banyamulenge, while simultaneously 
Rwanda and Uganda adopted a proactive stance in order to protect their 
security interests and defend the Banyamulenge community (Haskin, 
2005:87). That event set the stage for the beginning of what is known as 
“First African World war” or “Africa‟s Great War”, taking its name from 
the presence of eight foreign armed forces and several rebel groups, in 
the territory of the DRC (Reytjens, 1999:247). 
 
The sustained presence of foreign troops and officials in Kinshasa ignited 
widespread domestic accusations that Kabila was merely a “puppet” of 
Rwanda. Hence Kabila soon faced a problem of domestic legitimacy and 
the survival of his regime depended upon the emancipation from his 
foreign patrons. Therefore, war became inevitable as long as such 
development was incompatible with the interests of the leaders of 
Rwanda and Uganda (ibid).  
 
Foreign Involvement 
Almost immediately the alliances were formed. On the one hand, 
invading from the eastern part of the country, Rwanda, Uganda and 
Burundi intervened in order to disperse the rebel groups that found 
refuge in the territory of the DRC and launched attacks against these 
states (Shearer, 1999:92). The military strength of the invading countries 
was undisputable and if it were not for the intervention of the Namibian, 
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Zimbabwean, Chadian and Sudanese armies to support the Congolese 
government, Kinshasa would have easily fell  (Butantu, 2004:33). In the 
course of the war, Uganda and Rwanda established the proxy rebel group 
“Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie” (RCD), in order to 
promote their interests, with the active assistance of the local 
Banyamulenge community. RCD managed to penetrate into the Eastern 
parts of the country and overtake Bukavu, Uvira and by the end of 
August 1998 the diamond-centre city of Kisangani. By that time another 
Ugandan-backed rebel group was created which was called “Movement 
for the Liberation of the Congo” (MLC) (Haskin, 2005:91). However, the 
coalesced - to Kabila - forces, namely Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Chad 
and to a lessen extent Sudan with their intervention contributed to a 
mutual military stalemate which in combination with regional diplomatic 
initiatives eventually led to a ceasefire. In July 1999 the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement was signed by the governments of the DRC, Zimbabwe, 
Namibia, Angola, Rwanda and Uganda, but what is striking is that the 
rebel groups were excluded from these talks (ibid). Central provisions of 
Lusaka were the cessation of hostilities; the orderly withdrawal of foreign 
forces; the disengagement and redeployment of foreign forces; the 
disarmament of armed groups; the formation of a national army; the 
establishment of a “Joint Military Commission” (JMC) made up of all 
belligerent parties, with central objective to monitor the implementation 
of the agreement, the process of the disarmament of the armed factions 
 36 
and finally, the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission (Muchai, 
2002:192). The Lusaka Agreement assigned to the UN mission two broad 
roles. Firstly, to work in collaboration with the JMC in observing and 
monitoring the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of troops of 
foreign armed forces. Secondly, to forcefully track down and disarm the 
„negative forces‟, namely the members of rebel groups, under the 
provision of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Under these provisions, in 
1999 the UN authorized the deployment of the “Mission de l‟ 
Organization des Nations Unies en Republique Democratique du Congo” 
(MONUC) (ICG, 2000). Nevertheless, the Lusaka Agreement had various 
deficiencies, the most important of which was that it was essentially a 
“ceasefire agreement without a peace agreement” (Daley, 2006:312).  
  
However, the fighting between the rebel groups and the central 
government intensified over the control of the rich in natural resources 
eastern provinces and subsequently, the Lusaka Agreement had been 
repeatedly violated by all parties. The continued stalemate forced the 
belligerents to participate in numerous diplomatic initiatives and 
disengagement plans, such as in Kabala (Uganda) in 1999, Pretoria 
(South Africa) and Luanda in 2002 (Rogier, 2004:15). Formally, the 
conflict ended in 2003 with the establishment of the transitional 
government, which in July 2006 led the country to its first elections after 
1960‟s.  
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Analytical Remarks 
At this point I think it is important to make an analytical explication. It is 
probably most suitable to regard the human disaster in the DRC as three 
overlapping conflicts rather than a single conflict (Reytjens, 1999). The 
first conflict began in 1996 and ended with the demise of Mobutu. The 
second Congolese war (Africa‟s Great War) signified the termination of 
Kabila‟s dependence on Rwanda and Uganda and gradually came to an 
end with the Lusaka ceasefire Agreement. Finally, another conflict was 
running concomitantly with the others and continues until today, taking 
place in the eastern provinces of the country between armed factions. 
These conflicts are primarily related to the control over of territories rich 
in mineral resources, and became progressively defined in ethnic terms 
(“territorialization of ethnicity”) (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2005:10). 
Additionally we have to bear in mind that in essence the conflict in the 
DRC was multi-level: a) local; b) national; and c) regional and, as such, 
there has been a “cancerous metastasis” of foreign armies and military 
parties in the DRC from neighbouring countries (International Crisis 
Group-ICG, 2003:7). Hence, actors should not be seen in isolation, but 
within complex linkages with other actors that influence decision-
making, and subsequently it would be more appropriate to talk about 
“complex networks” of actors (Carayannis, 2003:232).  
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Embarrassing indicators 
Although typically the conflict is over from 2003 when the transitional 
government took power, in 2006 DRC continued to endure as the world‟s 
deadliest ongoing conflict accompanied by a disastrous humanitarian 
crisis. Some indicators might reveal the magnitude of this conflict. More 
specifically, since 1998, 3.9 million people have lost their lives in the 
DRC from war-related diseases and severe malnutrition, which equals to 
a shocking rate of 1.200 deaths per day or 31.000 per month (Coghlan et 
al, 2006:49). From the total of 3.9 million, only 300.000 casualties derive 
from the direct effects of violence (ibid). Additionally, 12% of the 
Congolese children do not reach their first birthday and this 
phenomenon is primarily attributed to infectious diseases, acute 
malnutrition, lack of medicine, and in general dysfunctional health 
services disrupted from the war (Kassa, 2003:85; Watchlist, 2003:9). 
What is equally striking is that the vast majority of these casualties are 
due to easily preventable and treatable diseases. Furthermore, the fact 
that although children represent less than 20% of the total population, 
women and children account for 40% of the casualties, indicates that the 
Congolese conflict is a total war where the line between combatants and 
civilians has vanished (Coghan et al, 2006:48; Montague, 2002:103). The 
link between the high levels of displacement, as a means of waging war, 
and the equally significant levels of civilian casualties deriving from these 
displacements, makes this remark even more obvious (Alfredson, 2002). 
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During 2002-2004, only 2% of the total casualties were attributed to 
war-related violence, while according to the most accurate survey “[T]he 
most devastating by-products of the conflict have been the disruption of 
the country‟s health services and food supplies. As a result, the vast 
majority of deaths have been among civilians and have been due to easily 
preventable and treatable illnesses such as fever and malaria, diarrhoea, 
respiratory infections, and malnutrition” (Coghlan et al, 2004:4). This 
problem is more acute in the eastern provinces where according to the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) between 10% and 30% suffers 
from severe malnutrition (ICG, 2003:13). Finally, the National Crude 
Mortality Rate (CMR) is 40% higher than the reported baseline for Sub-
Saharan Africa and 90% higher in eastern parts of the country, whereas 
under-5 children mortality was 97% higher in these provinces than the 
continental average (Watchlist, 2006:23). Finally the use of sexual 
violence and rape as a weapon of conducting war, contributed to the 
amplification of the HIV/AIDS disease to incredibly high levels (Csete, 
2002; Elbe, 2002:162; USIP, 2001). 
 
The conflict generated approximately 1.7 million internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) and 450.000 refugees (EIU, 16-3-2006). According to the 
Human Development Indicators (HDI), the DRC ranks among the poorest 
countries in the world with 50% of the Congolese population to receive 
one meal per day, while the 25% of the Congolese manage to have access 
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to a meal every second day (Saskia et al, 2002:386). The DRC is the 
world‟s deadliest conflict with casualties amounting up to 3.9 million 
deaths, exceeding any other contemporary conflict: Rwanda (800.000) 
Bosnia (250.000) and Darfur (70.000) (Coghlan et al, 2004:3). The 
question that naturally emerges from these indicators is: “on what 
grounds can the UN not be morally responsible for the extraordinary 
levels of human suffering in the DRC”?                      
                                      ************************* 
 
IV. SYNTHESIS: UN MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE DRC. 
 
1. The “spill-over” of a genocide. How inaction contributed to the 
transformation of a civil war into a continental one. 
 
The non-decision, of the UN during those 100 days, that the Rwandan 
genocide lasted, to authorise a military humanitarian intervention, apart 
from the approximately 800.000 dead Rwandans, had even longer-term 
implications for the whole Sub-Saharan region. The last days of the 
genocide (end of July 1994), found the perpetrators of the genocide 
surrounded by the Tutsi army. During this period the only remarkable 
decision taken by the UN was to authorize, under the diplomatic 
pressure of France, a limited in scale military humanitarian intervention, 
called “Operation Turquoise” (UN Security Council Resolution 929), 
 41 
deployed in the south-western part of Rwanda,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
with the primary objective to evacuate the foreign citizens and protect 
those under imminent threat (Melvern, 2000:210). Consequently, “[the 
UN Security Council] as an interim measure, it eventually authorized a 
French-led force that is credited with saving tens of thousands of lives, 
but also creating a situation in which advocates of, and participants in 
the genocide were able to withdraw to Zaire and regroup to pursue their 
struggle” (Berman, 2003:97). What is striking is that France, with the 
backing and the authorization of the UN Security Council (UNSC), 
essentially set up a supposedly humanitarian operation, but in reality 
they also provided a safe haven for the defeated Rwandan Army (ex-FAR) 
and the paramilitary “Interahamwe” (Lischer, 2005:80). Even the French 
media doubted about the humanitarian effectiveness, as well as the 
French incentives behind the establishment of “Operation Turquoise” 
(Huliaras, 1998:596). The creation of this humanitarian zone provided a 
secure retreat for the ex-Rwandan government, the Army, the 
perpetrators of the genocide while most importantly, the minimum 
policing within this zone, facilitated the evacuation of virtually all 
weapons at their disposal to Zaire, which enabled them in the future to 
regroup and launch attacks against the new regime in Kigali (Nzongola-
Ntalaja, 2004:8).  
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The emergence of the Tutsi-led government in Rwanda, and the 
subsequent change in the balance of power, amplified the fear of many 
Hutu of being prosecuted for their crimes during the genocide or 
becoming victims of acts of retribution. The vast majority of these people 
sought refuge to neighbouring countries and most significantly to Zaire 
(Melvern, 2000:212). However, there was neither a mechanism for 
identifying the perpetrators at the time of their influx to Zaire, nor a 
provision to disarm them (African Rights, 2000:4; Murison, 2002:226). 
Although it is difficult to assess the precise number of refugees, it is 
estimated that approximately 1 million had passed into Zaire at Goma 
and 200.000 more in Bukavu. It was the fastest and largest exodus ever 
recorded (Melvern, 2000:214). Therefore, the lack of vision concerning 
the post-genocide status-quo of the refugees, by the UN, makes this body 
accountable for letting the genocide to “spill-over” to neighbouring states, 
and most notably to Zaire. Equally significant point is the reluctance of 
the UN to set a mechanism for separating the perpetrators of the 
genocide from the main body of refugees and prosecute them to justice. 
Finally its inability to monitor and stop the flow of arms concurrently 
with the refugees is remarkable. To be sure, the UN faced a 
humanitarian problem of exceptional magnitude and thus assigning 
responsibilities, is not an easy task. Still, the inability to prevent a mass 
flow of refugees and its incapacity to disarm those with a record of gross 
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violations of human rights is unacceptable for an organisation heralding 
the promotion of peace and security.  
 
The other fundamental point of moral accountability of the UN is the 
management of the refugee problem when the refugees settled in Zaire. 
Over the next two years, through the assistance of Mobutu and the 
passivity of the UN, the same forces that committed the genocide in 
Rwanda, were reorganized and rearmed within the refugee camps in 
eastern Zaire and eventually launched attacks against both Rwanda and 
the local Banyamulenge (Tutsi) community (Dunn, 2003; Lischer, 
2005:82). The problem stems from the failure of the UN and other 
agencies - from the international aid community - to effectively control 
and manage these camps, which in combination with the high levels of 
armed refugees, resulted in the transformation of the refugee camps into 
a source of regional instability. These omissions constitute a crucial 
point of moral accountability of the UN, because it failed to adopt a 
coherent policy, in the face of a potential threat to the regional stability.  
 
It is not rare for refugee crises to function as a “strategy for war”. 
Frequently, the refugee camps provide multiple layers of protection for 
the radical refugees, such as international legitimacy; a shield against 
attack; pool of recruits; and a valuable source of food and medicine, thus 
facilitating the continuation of the armed struggle (Lischer, 2005:6). In 
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the case of Zaire, the combination of million of refugees, thousands of 
rebels and abundant humanitarian assistance acted as a catalyst for the 
spread of the conflict in the Great lakes (Lischer, 2005:73; Swarbrick, 
2003:164).  The UN by being inactive in the face of major humanitarian 
disasters and in effectively monitoring and disarming the flow of 
“genocidaires” in the refugee camps, it essentially contributed to the 
aggravation of the problem. As Linda Melvern (2000:224) perfectly 
depicted it was “probably the largest group of fugitive murderers ever 
assembled all fed and sheltered by the aid agencies”. Relief aid was 
stolen and taxed by these groups that controlled the camps and fuelled 
the war economy, which ultimately perpetuated the conflict (Shearer, 
2000:92). Among the central catalysts for the perpetuation of the war in 
the DRC, from 1996 onwards, was the role played by the UN Agencies 
and other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the delivery of aid 
between 1994 and 1996. During that period, the Interahamwe and ex- 
FAR militias that were hosted in the refugee camps were able to rearm 
and gain considerable military strength, which enabled them to launch 
cross-border attacks against Rwanda and ignite the pre-existing local 
tensions (ICG, 2003). The most critical factors that triggered the first 
Congolese war were the security threat posed by the Rwandan refugee 
camps to the neighbouring countries (Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi), in 
combination with the proliferation of armed factions, in Zaire, that 
opposed the leadership of these countries and posed an equally 
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significant threat (Rosenblaum, 1997; Smis and Oyatambwe, 2002:415). 
What is striking in the case of the UN management of the Zairian refugee 
crisis is that “although such a military activity was prohibited by the 
International convention, neither the UN Agencies, nor the larger 
international community intervened to halt the preparations” (Csete et al, 
2002:11). The UN is morally accountable because its ineffective 
management of the camps allowed “genocidaires” to become a state 
within the state and eventually become a source of regional 
destabilization (Melvern, 2000:215). The effects of this inaction became 
obvious over the next few years when the conflict resulted in an endless 
bloodshed of 3.9 million deaths. 
 
Thus, “the fundamental mistake by international actors was not the 
provision of the humanitarian aid per se but the unwillingness to 
undertake the steps required for security in the refugee camps” (Cater, 
2003:34). The threat to peace and security imposed by these refugees on 
other states should have activated a robust response under the chapter 
VII of the UN Charter and not a purely humanitarian action which 
reasserts the “humanitarian myopia” that characterises the UN in the 
face of humanitarian disasters. The UN‟s moral responsibility in this 
crucial point is successfully portrayed by a UNHCR (UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees) spokesperson who admitted that “the 
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involvement of aid agencies in the camps makes accomplices of us, 
helping [the militias] consolidate power” (Lischer, 2005:92).  
 
A final point is the omission of the UN to take effective measures in order 
to decrease the security concerns of the neighbouring countries that 
experienced the cross-border attacks. When these countries realised the 
inability, or the unwillingness of the UN, to prevent and effectively tackle 
these attacks, they decided to intervene militarily. Their action was 
justified on grounds of self-defence, although that obviously contravened 
international law. The insecurity that the Hutu refugees-militias posed to 
Kigali was so immense, that in 1996 Rwanda ordered the Zairian 
government to demise the refugee camps; otherwise Rwanda threatened 
Zaire with a robust response (Murison, 2002:229). The threat became 
real in late 1997 when Rwandan armed forces (RPA-Rwandan Patriotic 
Army), with the assistance of local proxies, launched a counter-offensive 
against the refugee camps which eventually generated mass refugee 
repatriation into Rwanda. However, the large scale of the repatriation did 
not enable the Rwandan government to monitor and prosecute those 
responsible for the genocide (Dunn, 2003:21). Thus the UN did nothing 
to prevent the self-help solution that was finally qualified by Rwanda, 
namely the military intervention and the demise of the refugee camps. 
Some sources indicate that the majority of the refugees who fled from the 
eastern to the western part of Zaire, after the RPA‟s attacks, were 
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slaughtered while some estimate the number of casualties up to 200.000 
(Emizet, 2000:179). These attacks forced the UNHCR and other 
organizations to withdraw from the area and to admit that they were 
“unable to ensure the protection of refugees” (Murison, 2002:228). Such 
a striking “inaction (of the UN) jeopardizes the long established legal and 
humanitarian principles of international relations, while challenging the 
relevance of conflict resolution mechanisms” (Smis and Oyatambwe, 
2002:413). 
 
The UN‟s omissions in the refugee crisis of the Great Lakes region 
signified its failure to prevent the transformation of a civil conflict into a 
continental war that involved nine states and numerous armed factions. 
More explicitly, the UN failed to develop one of its central functions, 
namely that of conflict prevention (Mack and Furlong, 2004:60), which is 
enshrined in Article 1 of the UN charter underlining the need for: 
“effective collective measures for prevention and removal of threats to 
peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of 
the Peace”                                       (Article 1, par. 1 UN Charter) 
 
The UN recognised its failure and in the aftermath of the Great Lakes 
disaster a new approach emerged –as analyzed in Resolution 1296 - 
according to which the Secretary General may request, from the UN 
agencies, to bring into attention incidents involving the militarization of 
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refugee camps, because the UNCHR was totally ineffective in preventing 
the militarization of the Rwandan refugee camps (Loescher, 2004:170).  
 
2. Aggression . 
“The organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all 
its members”          (Article 2, par. 1 UN Charter) 
 
“All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means 
[…]” 
                   (Article 2, par. 3 UN Charter) 
 
“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the UN”    
                                                                                   (Article 2, par. 4 UN Charter). 
 
The international order characterising the international society is 
founded on a horizontal system of rules which derives logically from the 
principle of sovereign equality among its member-states (Thakur, 
2004:199). The founding principle of this society – as expressed in the 
UN system - is the doctrine of “collective security”. This doctrine implies 
the obligation of this collective international body to intervene when one 
of the “equally sovereign” member-states of the UN experiences a 
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violation of one or more of the central norms of this international society 
– namely state sovereignty; non-intervention; non-use of force; and 
territorial integrity - in order to uphold these principles and put down 
any aggressive threat posed by any state (Sullivan, 1999). Despite the 
obvious indications of recurrent violation of the principles of territorial 
integrity and state sovereignty of the DRC by its neighbouring countries, 
the UN did nothing to address and redress this problem. Two factors 
contributing to this violation were the continuous presence of foreign 
armed groups in the DRC and the illegal exploitation of the Congolese 
natural resources by local armed proxies of foreign countries. 
 
The conflict in the DRC essentially included armed forces from several 
neighbouring countries and, as such, the DRC became the battlefield of 
various foreign conflicts (ICG, 1999:7). Essentially, there were four 
foreign overlapping conflicts embedded in the Congolese conflict. Initially 
it was the struggle between the Rwandan government, which attempted 
to hunt down ex-FAR soldiers and the Interahamwe perpetrators of the 
genocide, and the Hutu rebel groups that launched attacks against 
Kigali, posing a serious threat to the security of the regime (Prunier, 
1997). Notably, the ex-RPF soldiers became known as “soldats sans 
frontiers” (soldiers without borders) (Dunn, 2003: 150). In the same 
manner, Uganda and Angola experienced a similar security problem with 
their own rebels that were stationed in the DRC borders and posed a 
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serious threat to their respective regimes (ICG, 1999). Finally, the DRC 
hosted the continuation of the Burundian civil war which began in 1993, 
between the Burundian government (FAB-Forces Armees Burundaises) 
and the FDD (Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie) rebels (Ginifer, 
2002:123). For foreign observers, it was a major paradox to see 
“Angolans fighting Angolans in western Congo and Rwandans fighting 
Rwandans in the East” (Dunn, 2003:151). The presence of so many 
uninvited foreign armed groups in the territory of a sovereign country 
illustrates the “collapse” of the Congolese state, and denotes the inability 
of the international society to uphold its founding principles. 
 
This became even more obvious in the aftermath of the Rwandan 
intervention in Zaire to disperse the refugee camps. Although that was 
an apparent act of aggression against one of its member-states and 
subsequently a violation of the central rules of the UN, the UN did 
nothing to redress the problem. What the DRC experienced was an 
outright “aggression” by a coalition of neighbouring states. Aggression is 
defined as any violation of the territorial integrity or political sovereignty 
of an independent state and it is remarkable because “it is the only crime 
that states can commit against other states” (Walzer, 1977:51). The 
respect of the territorial integrity of a state provides a minimum level of 
acceptable coexistence, while simultaneously the national borders reflect 
the security of the political community behind these borders. Hence, it is 
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very important for the survival of the international society to uphold 
these rules; otherwise a dangerous precedent is set for the future. “The 
victim of aggression fights in self-defence, but he isn‟t alone defending 
himself, for aggression is a crime against the society as a whole” 
(ibid:59). The aggression against the territorial integrity of the DRC by 
some of its neighbouring countries “contravenes the principles and 
purposes of the Charter of the UN […]. It is namely the non-appeal of 
force, of the peaceful settlement of disputes, of respect of territorial 
integrity, of the national sovereignty and political independence of states 
and of the intangibility of borders” (Butandu, 2004:63). The issue that 
emerges from this remark is not only legal, but most importantly a moral 
one. If the international body authorized to settle the international 
disputes peacefully and to uphold the central tenets of the international 
community fails, then these rules have no moral and instrumental value. 
The UN as the primary guardian of these principles bears the moral 
burden for any failure to uphold them. The UN is founded on the 
doctrine of collective security which is activated when one of its member-
states faces a threat for its security. If this is so, then what is the 
justification for not intervening in the DRC when its sovereignty and 
territorial integrity were repeatedly violated?  
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“You never finish eating the meat of an elephant” 
Moreover, in the DRC, the violation of these norms did not occur only in 
military terms; the breach of the state sovereignty was equally apparent 
through other forms of intervention, such as the illegal exploitation of the 
natural resources of the DRC by foreign armed groups. The original 
motives of foreign actors in entering the war were not economic but 
rather a combination of regime security, the prevention of new ethnic 
cleansing against their community and more generally, a desire to 
expand their political influence in the region. Economic interests 
emerged as significant issues later in the path of war, when these 
countries were unable to achieve an early victory and finance their war 
effort (Nest et al, 2006:27). The emergence of economic interests and the 
subsequent illegal exploitation of the Congolese natural resources 
transformed and perpetuated the conflict.  
 
Broadly speaking, the exploitation occurred in two phases. The first 
phase (1996-1998) was characterized by looting and quick transfer of 
various resources - such as minerals, coffee, wood and money - across 
borders, to the neighbouring patron-states and afterwards to the 
international market. The second phase (1998-2003) of the exploitation 
was characterized by a more “systematic and systemic” planning and 
organization of the exploitation while this activity was primarily related to 
minerals, such as diamonds, timber, gold, and cassiterite (Rupyia, 
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2005:6). Control over regions that were rich in natural resources 
provided unique incentives for the armed factions to continue fighting, 
because the exploitation of these resources helped financing the war 
(Emizet, 2006; Ndikumana and Emizet, 2003:2; Montaque, 2002:126). 
Hence, violence became a means to achieve those objectives and 
subsequently there were more stakes invested in the continuation of the 
war, rather than in peace. The fighting between former allies, who had 
justified their invasion of the DRC on security grounds, appeared to be 
the eye-opener for the UN on the real-economic motivations behind the 
second war, which consequently triggered the creation of the “UN Panel 
of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth in the DRC” (Grignon, 2003:44). 
 
The four reports, published by the Panel between 2001 and 2003, clearly 
indicated that Rwandan, Ugandan and Zimbabwean army officers, as 
well as members of the Congolese elite, were growing rich from the illegal 
exploitation of the mineral wealth of Congo. Additionally, they exposed 
how the extraction of these resources helped the armed groups to finance 
their war-effort and subsequently to perpetuate the war (Cuvelier and 
Raeymaekers, 2002; Nest, 2001; Samset, 2002:465; Tsitereke, 2003:89). 
The Panel came to the conclusion that the illegal exploitation of the 
natural resources resulted in widespread abuses of human rights in the 
region and that the withdrawal of foreign armies would not end the 
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resource exploitation, since the elite-network had created a self-financing 
war-economy by delegating local proxies (HRW, 2005; UN DOC 
S/2002/1146). As the Panel indicated “without the wealth generated by 
the illegal exploitation of natural resources, arms cannot be bought, 
hence the conflict which almost always involves grave human rights 
abuses and large-scale population displacement, cannot be perpetuated” 
(UN DOC S/2003/1027:19). The reports elucidated the mechanism of 
looting. At the core of the resource exploitation were the “elite networks” 
which were comprised of a small core of political, military elites, and 
businessmen, all of whom cooperated in order to generate revenues and 
ensure the viability of their economic activities (illegal exploitation) 
through the control of security forces (Carayannis, 2002:233; Grignon, 
2003:43).   
 
The major problem emerging from this trend is that the illegal extraction 
of minerals - such as gold, columbo-tantalite (Coltan) and diamonds - by 
the rebel groups and the leaders of foreign governments, caused a major 
decline in the production, the exports and eventually the revenues of the 
government of the DRC, while concurrently it ignited the exports of 
Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe (Ndikumana and Emizet, 2003:22). The 
fall of production in minerals, the decline in tax income and the drop in 
international aid and grants, were all triggered by the “occupation” of the 
Eastern DRC, from 1998, by foreign armed groups, which subsequently 
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resulted in the rapid decline of public revenues (Olsson and Fors, 
2004:329). “Between 1996-1997, Rwanda‟s Coltan production doubled 
bringing up to $ 20 million per month in revenue […] From 1997-1998 
the annual volume of Uganda‟s diamond exports jumped from 1500 
carats to about 11.300 […] [and] since 1996 Ugandan gold exports have 
increased tenfold” (Haskin, 2005:114). It is remarkable that Uganda had 
no reported Coltan production before 1995, while exports increased 
gradually between 1997 and 1998 (Olsson and Fors, 2004:326). “Rwanda 
is currently exporting five times more cassiterite that it produces […] It is 
highly likely that these imports derived predominantly from the Eastern 
DRC” (Global Witness, 2005). Hence the stabilization of the Rwanda and 
Uganda was achieved at the expense of DRC‟s stability, security and 
wealth.  
 
This vicious cycle of violence, exploitation and perpetuation of the 
conflict is perfectly delineated in the Congolese phrase “You never finish 
eating the meat of an elephant” (ICG, 2003:28). An unambiguous 
indication of the link between natural resources and the fuelling of the 
war is that Uganda‟s defence budget in 1999 increased by 89% compared 
to the previous fiscal year, while all these revenues were gathered at the 
expense of the DRC (Clark, 2001:276). The Rwandan and Ugandan 
armies officially withdrew from the DRC in 2002 and 2003 respectively. 
However, each of them left behind local proxies who, with the continued 
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assistance from their external backers, fought for the control over trade 
routes and the control of mineral-rich areas; this phenomenon is known 
as “military commercialism” (HRW, 2005; Kennes, 2002:605). This novel 
phenomenon generated grave violations of human rights of the local 
populations, such as mass displacements (ibid). Rwanda was the patron 
of “Rassemblement Congolese pour la Democratie” (RCD), situated in 
Goma, whose main sources of revenue were the extraction of Coltan, 
diamonds and the taxation of the trade conducted in the region. In 2000 
the revenues gathered from the exploitation of diamonds amounted up to 
200.000$ per month and 1 million $ from Coltan (Nest et al, 2006:51). It 
is worth mentioning that the RCD-Goma had replaced the local currency 
with Rwandan currency.  
 
Finally, it is a tragic irony that “Diamonds cannot be found in the soils of 
Uganda and Rwanda, and authorities of both countries confirm that they 
have no production of this mineral. Yet over the last few years, both 
countries have exported diamonds worth millions of US dollars. From 
1997 to 1998 Ugandan exports were multiplied by 12 [and] Rwanda‟s 
export of diamonds had reached a level 90 times higher than during the 
entire year of 1998” (Samset, 2002:471). Even more striking is that 
“while the combined diamond exports of Uganda and Rwanda more than 
doubled from 1998 until 2000, on the contrary exports from the DRC 
were halved” (Lemarchant, 2002:393). All these indications explain why 
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the Congolese conflict was characterized, in Clausewitzean terms as “the 
continuation of economics by other means” (Jackson, 2002:519). 
 
The UN is morally accountable because although it was cognizant of the 
problem of illegal exploitation and the subsequent violation of the state 
sovereignty - monopoly over those resources - it took minimal steps to 
tackle this violation (Grignon, 2006:69; HRW, 2005; Prunier, 1997). The 
monopoly over the extraction of the natural resources of a country and 
the monopoly over taxation compose two exclusive competences of the 
sovereign. The UN acts as a guardian of the founding principles of the 
international society and subsequently, any failure burdens this 
international body. Moreover, the double standards that the UN set 
establish a dangerous precedent for the future. On the one hand, when 
state sovereignty and territorial integrity were violated in other historical 
instances, such as in Kuwait (1991) the UN immediately gave a robust 
response. Furthermore, the main argument provided against 
humanitarian intervention is the respect for the state sovereignty while 
the instrumentalist-pluralist argument is that the respect of these 
principles at least provides a minimum of orderly co-existence in the 
international society (Wheeler, 2000). In the face of the demanding 
question of humanitarian intervention, we observe a “sanctification” of 
the norm of state sovereignty, which implies non-intervention. On the 
other hand, though when one of the “sovereign member states” of the UN 
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experiences a repeated violation of this “sacred” norm, the same 
organization abstains from upholding the rules. This constitutes a major 
paradox in the UN system. Although, this is primarily a legal problem, it 
also exposes a key failure of the UN to be morally responsible and 
consistent with its founding principles.  
 
In December 2005, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled the case 
brought by the DRC against Uganda for violating its sovereignty by 
committing human rights abuses and illegally exploiting natural 
resources between 1998 and 2003, when Uganda occupied the Ituri 
district. The ICJ found Uganda guilty of all charges and subsequently, it 
ordered Uganda to pay reparations amount to $10 billion (EIU, 
17/03/06). The UN by being aware of the continuous violation of the 
DRC‟s sovereignty and effectively responding is morally responsible for 
the perpetuation of the war. 
 
3.   MONUC 
History of MONUC 
At this point the analysis will discuss the role of the designated UN 
peacekeeping mission for the DRC, in order to attest whether this 
mission bears some moral responsibility for the perpetuation and the 
magnitude of the conflict.  
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The Somali debacle and the Rwandan genocide served to highlight the 
complexity of African civil conflicts, characterised by the absence of a 
sovereign authority which posed a major problem for any peacekeeping 
effort to cross the “Mogadishu line” (Yorke, 2001:81). Therefore most 
western powers which dominate the UNSC, were not willing to intervene 
in Africa and evaded their responsibility by promoting the notion of 
“African solutions for African problems” (Smis and Oyatambwe, 
2002:427). The same attitude characterized the UN‟s management of the 
Congolese conflict. 
 
The UN Secretary General illustrated from the beginning that the military 
component of the peacekeeping mission, would depend heavily on the 
gradual deployment of the MONUC in three phases (UN DOC 
S/1999/790): 
Phase I: After the Lusaka Agreement, a force of 90 UN military liaison 
officers, were deployed in the country for a period of three months to 
advice the headquarters when to proceed to Phase II (UNSC Resolutions 
1258 and 1273). However, the rapid deterioration of the situation on the 
ground, in early 2000, forced the Secretary General to advance on Phase 
II earlier. Subsequently, the UN authorized the expansion of MONUC 
mission, encompassing 5,537 peacekeepers, but, with a mandate limited 
to act “not as an interposition force […] they will not have the capacity to 
protect the civilian population from armed attack” (UN DOC. 
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S./2000/30). Additionally, MONUC was mandated to monitor the 
ceasefire, the cessation of hostilities and the disengagement (UNSC 
Resolution 1376). 
Phase III: This phase is characterized by the adoption of Resolution 
1493, which signified the departure of MONUC from Chapter VI, towards 
Chapter VII (Malan and Porto, 2003:11). Simultaneously there had been 
an increase in the military forces from 6.100 (May 2003) to 10.800 
(September 2003) (Boshoff, 2003:137). Equally, the other central 
characteristic of this phase has the focus on monitoring and assistance 
in the Disarmament, Disengagement and Reintegration (DDR) process. 
The current mandate (UNSC Resolution 1565) sets as central objectives 
the proactive contribution to the pacification and the improvement of the 
security in the country; the support to conflict resolution; the 
improvement of border security; the observation and monitoring of the 
hostilities, the disengagement and reintegration of all parties to the 
conflict (Haskin, 2005:158). Although the Secretary General demanded 
13.100 soldiers to be deployed, the unwillingness of the member-states 
to contribute in manpower, forced the UN to deploy solely 5.900 
additional military personnel (ibid). The “New MONUC” or MONUC II 
came into existence only in the post-Chapter VII period (UNSC 
Resolution 1493) in July 2003, which practically means four years after 
the initial presence of the UN in the country. According to a MONUC‟s 
official “we wasted three years. We have nothing to do with the previous 
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MONUC. It was the wrong mission” (Alusala, 2004: 65). The current 
mandate of MONUC (UNSC Resolution 1565) authorizes the existence of 
15.417 troops; 544 military observers and 368 civilian police officers, 
qualifying MONUC as the largest UN peacekeeping operation, currently 
in the world, with the largest operational budget, totalling US $957.8 
millions, in 2004-2005 (EIU, December 2003; Robinson and Walt, 
2006:32; Wrong, 2006:26). 
 
Chronic deficiencies. 
From a historical perspective, the concept of peacekeeping was designed 
to maintain peace between states in war. More specifically, the UN 
peacekeeping was an invention to facilitate to cessation of hostilities and 
give time to negotiations and peace initiatives. Traditional peacekeeping 
was to be found in the middle ground between the peaceful settlement of 
international disputes (Chapter VI) and the peace enforcement (Chapter 
VII), which justifies why it is called “chapter Six and a half” (Sens, 
2004:142). Ever since its inception peacekeeping heavily relied on the 
“Holy Trinity”, namely the consent of the warring parties, the neutrality 
and impartiality of the peacekeeping mission and finally the non-use of 
force from the peacekeepers (Bellamy and Williams, 2004:4; Donald, 
2002:22). However, the radical transformation of the international arena 
in the post cold war era, made the UN peacekeeping missions inadequate 
in tackling complex humanitarian emergencies, such as engagement in 
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“collapsed states” and in facing massive human rights abuses (Block and 
Freedman, 2003). Hence, this trinity is unsuitable for complex interstate 
conflicts which emerged since 1990‟s because “neutrality in the face of 
huge Human Rights abuses jeopardizes (peacekeeping) force‟s physical 
and political survival” (Donald, 2002:21). Two major reports documented 
the Organization‟s appalling failures, in Rwanda and Srebrenica, in the 
1990‟s. More precisely, in the “Brahimi” report, it was clearly stated that 
“many of the problems that had caused these failures were endemic to 
the UN system”, referring to the inconsistency between the lightly armed 
peacekeepers and the highly demanding UN Resolution (Durch et al, 
2003:3; Mack and Furlong, 2004:64). This important conclusion is very 
relevant to MONUC‟s mission, where there is an obvious disjuncture 
between the extremely demanding mission requirements and the limited 
capabilities provided on the ground (Cater, 2003:36). Another endemic 
problem is the lack of coordination among UN agencies, deployed in the 
DRC, which severely affects the efficiency of the peacekeeping mission 
(Ricci, 2003; Van Brabant, 2001:142). 
 
MONUC‟s Inefficiencies. 
The first and most important deficiency of MONUC was its concept of 
engagement, according to which the UN‟s presence would expand only as 
long as conditions in the field allowed doing so. However, by pursuing 
this approach “the UN‟s presence would not improve the security 
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situation, but rather […] the security conditions would determine the 
extent of UN‟s presence” (Rogier, 2003:8). Thus in essence, MONUC is 
primarily an “observation mission” mandated to monitor the 
implementation of the ceasefire, to supervise the disengagement and 
redeployment of armed forces (African Rights, 2000:192).  
 
Additionally, although Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement called for a UN peace 
enforcement mission, under Chapter VII, which would allocate the 
sufficient resources in order to disarm the “negative forces”, and 
subsequently remove the Rwandan and Ugandan pretext for intervention 
in the DRC, in reality the UN did not provide the adequate response 
because it had a significantly divergent approach on the DDR from that 
envisioned in Lusaka (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004:18). The Lusaka 
Agreement ordered a forcible disarmament while on the contrary the 
UNSC and the Secretary General insisted on the voluntary DDR, 
considering the high risk of massive casualties and the long-term 
military commitment in a potential mission to disarm these armed 
factions and “genocidaires” (Swarbrick, 2003:174). However, such a 
“voluntary” approach did not seem realistic, considering the persistent 
unwillingness of the foreign armed groups and the signatories of the 
Lusaka Agreement to voluntarily withdraw and disarm (Rogier, 2003:7). 
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Furthermore there is a disparity between the mandate and the resources 
allocated. The number of the existing troops authorised to carry out the 
demanding mandate of disarmament is extremely limited for a country 
that has the size of Western Europe. Another obscure point about 
MONUC is the long period between the Lusaka call for deployment and 
the UN response. In the words of Mansson “despite the reports […] on 
widespread abuses since April 1999, almost a year passed before the 
situation was (characterized as) a threat to international peace and 
security” and subsequently the authorization for the deployment of 
peacekeeping force was not given until February 2000 (UNSC Resolution 
1291) (Mansson, 2005:505). 
 
The inadequacy of MONUC has also another parameter. In July 2003 
(Resolution 1493), the UN imposed an arms embargo under which all 
states were required to abstain from both direct and indirect supply, sale 
and transfer of arms to all foreign and Congolese armed groups operating 
in the eastern provinces and more precisely to the Kivus and Ituri (EIU, 
March 2005). Nevertheless, the limited and insufficient presence of 
MONUC in combination with the voluntary conception of the 
disarmament mission reduced the efficacy of the monitoring of the arms 
embargo in the borders and airfields and subsequently this affected the 
effectiveness of the embargo (Global Witness, 2005:12; Watchlist, 
2006:40). In 2005, the designated group of experts published several 
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reports (UN DOC S/2005/30; UN DOC S/2005/436) indicating repeated 
violations of the arms embargo observed primarily in civil aviation and in 
the borders (EIU, December 2004; EIU, March 2005). 
 
The fall of Bukavu. 
An incident that reaffirms the above thesis is the fall of the fourth largest 
city in the DRC, namely Bukavu. In May 2004, a former rebel officer who 
refused to integrate into the new Congolese army began moving from 
South Kivu towards Bukavu, under the pretext of preventing genocide 
against the local Banyamulenge community (Haskin, 2005:162). 
Although MONUC attempted to establish a buffer zone around Bukavu, 
the city finally fell on June, 1st 2004 triggering a flow of approximately 
4.000 displaced persons (Economist, 4/02/2006; Mansson, 2005:212). 
The Congolese people blamed the UN for not using its robust (Chapter 
VII) mandate to prevent the fall of Bukavu and to defend the residents 
experiencing the crudest face of physical violence including, looting, 
killing and rape (HRW, 2004). This inconsistency between the mandate‟s 
provisions and the situation on the field is perfectly illustrated in 
Secretary General‟s 3rd Report on the situation in the DRC: 
 
“The establishment of the peacekeeping mandate of MONUC under 
Chapter VII […] has raised expectations that the mission will enforce the 
Peace throughout the country. However, there is a wide gap between 
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such expectations and the mission‟s capacity to fulfil them”     
                                                   (UN DOC S/2004/650:7) 
 
 
All these inefficiencies of MONUC, might explain why the local population 
calls the blue helmets “butterflies”; pretty to look at, but otherwise 
useless (Economist, 12/03/2005). 
 
The UN as a part of the problem? 
It is not only the acts of omissions and the incapability of MONUC to 
enforce its mandate, but most importantly there are recorded occasions 
in which members of MONUC are directly responsible for the aggravation 
of the situation of human rights in the region. There are reported charges 
against blue helmets who were engaged in criminal acts such as trading 
food, money or even jobs for sexual contact (EIU, March, 2005). 
Undoubtedly this is a chronic problem referred to as “peacekeeping 
economy”, in the relevant literature, indicating the contribution of the 
peacekeepers to the economic institutionalization of potential exploitation 
of gender relations in mission areas, such as sex tourism (Higate, 2004). 
However, what is striking is that although the UN was cognizant of the 
problem, it has adopted no substantial measures to tackle the roots of 
problem and its stance is limited to the establishment of a “code of 
conduct” with no provision for scrutiny. However, the UN has no 
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competence to follow through any of the investigations currently made, 
because this is the jurisdiction of the countries that send the 
peacekeepers. This is a deep cause of concern as the UN has not adopted 
a common legal punitive system for all soldiers (Du Plessis and Pete, 
2004:8). 
 
All these points of moral responsibility of the UN might seem minor, 
compared to the magnitude of the problem, but in essence the UN did 
not only abstain from preventing such conflicts but with its omissions, it 
indirectly contributed to the perpetuation of the conflicts.  
 
                 ********************* 
 
         V.   Conclusion 
The central objective of this dissertation was to critically evaluate the 
UN‟s moral responsibility in the world‟s deadliest conflict since World 
War II, namely the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
However, some other questions emerged and were answered. More 
precisely, it would have been an inconsistent intellectual exercise to hold 
the UN “a priori” morally responsible without being able to possess moral 
agency, that is being independent from its constitutive member-states. 
Thus, in the first part of this dissertation the primary objective was to 
put forward a theoretical argument upon which to build a theory of 
 68 
institutional responsibility, which enables to critically assess whether an 
institution, a group, or an organization can be held responsible for its 
actions and omissions, and if so, under what preconditions. The 
argumentation of this dissertation relied heavily on the work of Toni 
Erskine, on institutional moral responsibility. 
 
The dissertation‟s first step was to prove the conditions under which an 
institution can be accounted as a moral agent that is independent from 
its members. There is a consensus on the literature that a collectivity in 
order to qualify as moral agent should possess (a) an identity that is 
more than the sum of the identities of its constitutive parts; (b) a 
decision-making structure; (c) an identity over time; and (d) a conception 
of itself as a unit”. Afterwards, an argument was put forward that the UN 
does possess these features of moral agency and as such can be 
considered morally responsible for its actions and omissions.  
 
The second part of this paper was primarily preoccupied with the case-
study. An analytical presentation of the background of the conflict was 
critical in the effort to elucidate and comprehend the objectives and the 
actions of the parties to the conflict while facilitated the critical 
assessment of the UN‟s moral accountability in this conflict. In Part three 
the analysis attempted to critically evaluate the UN‟s moral responsibility 
in the Congolese conflict, by synthesising the theoretical part with the 
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case-study. More specifically, there were three tenets in the analysis. 
Firstly, argued that the UN‟s inaction and lack of coherent policy 
contributed to the “spill-over” of the genocide from Rwanda to the DRC. 
The authorisation of Operation Turquoise which established an 
“emergency exit” for the Hutu “genocidaires”; the evacuation of Rwanda 
without any provision for monitoring and disarming the “Interahamwe”; 
and most importantly the control of the refugee camps by the radical 
Hutus in (the then) Zaire, which facilitated the efforts of these factions to 
continue their attacks against Rwanda constitute the most striking 
indications of UN‟s moral responsibility. Equally the UN did nothing to 
decrease the security concerns of the neighbouring countries which 
significantly contributed to the adoption of a “self-help” solution by 
Rwanda which invaded Zaire in order to disperse the source of its 
insecurity (refugee camps) instead of a “peaceful settlement” according to 
the UN principles. Hence the UN indirectly contributed to the 
transformation of a civil conflict into a continental war. 
 
Secondly, the UN bears the moral burden of being inconsistent with its 
founding principles. More precisely, the DRC (ex-Zaire), an “equally 
sovereign” member of the UN, experienced a severe and repeated 
violation of almost all of these principles but the UN did nothing to 
redress this issue. More precisely, the incursion of the Rwandan armed 
forces (RPA) to disperse the refugee camps, in 1996; the invasion of eight 
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neighbouring states, in 1998 and the continuous presence of some of 
them in order to eliminate the rebels situated in the DRC and finally the 
illegal exploitation of the DRC‟s natural resources with grave impact for 
the stabilization of the DRC, all reveal a violation of the state sovereignty 
of the DRC and the subsequent inaction of the UN to take any 
substantial response. 
 
Finally, the UN is morally responsible for the scope of the peacekeeping 
mission in the DRC (MONUC), which was at least inadequate. Initially 
the deployment of the first peacekeepers was limited if we take into 
consideration the vastness of the country and the complexity of the 
conflict while this came too late. Additionally, MONUC, until 2003, was a 
duplication of former peacekeeping operations reproducing the chronic 
and structural inefficiencies of UN peacekeeping missions. Finally there 
are reported instances were the UN, and its representatives 
(peacekeepers) contributed to the escalation of the humanitarian 
situation in the DRC, such as the fall of Bukavu and the allegations 
against blue helmets for sexual misconduct. In brief, the UN‟s inaction 
and lack of a coherent policy, generally on the Great Lakes region, and in 
the DRC in particular, directly or indirectly contributed the perpetuation 
of the conflict with obvious consequences for the international peace and 
stability. 
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The concluding proposition of this study is that the notions of 
responsibility, morality and ethics are necessary for the study of 
international politics. This dissertation takes as granted that a 
rudimentary concept of international society exists. The primary threat 
that every society faces is to vanish. In this context, the survival and the 
peaceful continuation of any society constitute the central objectives of 
any society and this explains the rationale behind the evolution of the 
international society from the “state of nature”. Responsibility, morality, 
and ethics are very important for the fulfilment of this objective, as long 
as they function as a “safety net” against potential threats for the 
survival of this society. The instrumental argument put forward by the 
analysis is that responsibility, justice, morality, are all complementary 
features that characterise a society, function as a “least common 
denominator” of acceptable societal behaviour and provide predictability 
in the future. As Walsh (1970:13) brilliantly put it, the quest for moral 
responsibility symbolizes the “[…] exercise of moral pressure […] [which] 
is part of an elaborate system by which society tries to protect itself 
against undesirable forms of behaviour”. This might explicate why it is so 
important for the survival of the international society to ascribe 
responsibilities to the most powerful and central actors of contemporary 
international politics, that is organizations, multinational corporations, 
and NGOs. Because by this way we establish a set of expectations for 
their future behaviour and they become accountable if they fail to do so. 
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Furthermore, assigning moral responsibility to the UN is even more 
important because it is the “collective of the collectives” and most 
significantly it is the guardian of this society. It is absurd to talk about 
the existence of an “international society” without having expectations 
from its central representative, namely the UN. Alternatively put, if an 
international society exists, then we need an international institution to 
act as a guarantor of its central norms and to be accountable for 
upholding these norms1. Indeed the UN was historically founded on the 
will to establish an international body that will act as a guardian against 
new holocausts.  
 
The quest for moral responsibility of collective international bodies today 
is necessary and has very important practical implications. Enquiries 
related to the UN moral responsibility, guarantee the efficient prevention 
of new holocausts or genocides in the future. Indeed the UN was 
primarily founded on the slogan “Never Again”. Thus the theoretical 
engagement with this field has some very tangible and humanitarian 
implications. The critical stance towards the UN, adopted in this 
dissertation, is a constructive critique which has as primary objective the 
more efficient functioning of the UN in the future. It is a firm belief of this 
dissertation that the case-study of the Congolese conflict reasserts the 
                                               
1 I am very grateful to Dr. Marie Breen Smyth for this point. 
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primary hypothesis that the UN can be held morally accountable for its 
actions and omissions. 
                                          ********************* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 74 
Bibliography  
 African Rights (2000) The Democratic Republic of Congo. The Cycle of 
Conflict. Which Way out in the Kivus? London, African Rights. 
 Alfredson Lisa (2002) „Child Soldiers, Displacement and Human 
Security‟, Disarmament Forum, No. 3, pp. 17-27. Also available at: 
www.unidir.ch 
 Alusala Nelson (2004) DRC: On the Road to Disarmament, In Institute for 
Security Studies Monograph, No 98, pp. 56-73. Also available at: 
www.iss.org.za/pubs/monographs.No98/chap4.pdf. 
 Baier Kurt (1998) „Guilt and Responsibility‟. In Individual and Collective 
Responsibility, edited by Peter French, pp.93-116, Rochester, Vermont, 
Schenkman Books. 
 Barnett N. Michael and Finnemore Martha (1993) „The Politics, Power 
and Pathologies of International Organizations‟. International 
Organization, Vol. 53, No. 4, pp. 699-732. 
 Barnett N. Michael (1997) „The UN Security Council, Indifference and 
Genocide in Rwanda‟. Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 551-578. 
 Barnett N. Michael (2002) Eyewitness to A Genocide. The United Nations 
and Rwanda. Ithaca, Cornell University Press. 
 Berman G. Eric (2003) „The Multinational Force for the Congo‟, African 
Security Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 97-98. 
 Bellamy J. Alex and Williams Paul (2004) „Thinking Anew about Peace 
Operations‟, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 1-15. 
 Block Robert and Freedman M. Alix (01/10/2003) „The UN: Searching for 
relevance; Mission Improbable: UN Peacekeeping is a troubled Art, Congo 
Mss; Rich nations No Longer send Troops, and Sometimes There‟s No 
Peace to Keep; Uruguans in devil‟s Caldron‟, Wall Street Journal, page A.1 
 Boshoff Henri (2003) „Overview of MONUC‟s Military Strategy and 
Concept of Operations‟. In Challenges to Peace Implementation. The UN 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Editors Malan Mark and 
Porto J. Gomes, pp. 135-145, Pretoria, Institute of Security Studies. Also 
available at: www.iss.org.za 
 75 
 Bovens Mark (1998) „The Quest for Responsibility. Accountability and 
Citizenship in Complex Organizations‟. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. 
 Brown Chris (2003) „Moral Agency and International Society: reflections 
on Norms, the UN, the Gulf War, and the Kosovo campaign‟. In Can 
Institutions Have Responsibilities? Collective Agency and International 
Relations, Edited by Erskine Toni, pp. 51-68, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 Butandu N. Rigobert (2004) Forgotten War. The Criminal Invasion of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. The International Conspiracy Unveiled. 
Baltimore, Publish America. 
 Carayannis Tatiana (2003) „The Complex Wars of the Congo: Towards a 
New Analytical Approach‟, Journal of African and Asian Studies, Vol. 38, 
No. 2-3, pp. 232-255. 
 Cater Charles (2003) The Political Economy of Conflict and the UN 
Intervention: Rethinking the Critical Cases of Africa. In The Political 
Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, pp. 19-45, 
Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 Coghlan Ben, Brennan Rick, Ngoy Pascal, Dofara David, Otto Brad, 
Steward Tony (2004) „Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: 
Results from a Nationwide Survey‟. 
 Coghlan Ben, Brennan Rick, Ngoy Pascal, Dofara David, Otto Brad, 
Steward Tony (2006) „Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: 
Results from a Nationwide Survey‟. Lancet, Vol. 367, pp. 44-1. (Survey 
conducted by the International Rescue Committee). Also available at: 
www.thelancet.com and 
www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/congo/2006/0107survey.pdf. 
 Copp David (1997) „Defending the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: 
Blameworthiness and Moral Responsibilities‟. Nous, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 
441-456. 
 Copp David (1998) „Responsibility and Collective Inaction‟. In Individual 
and Collective Responsibility, edited by Peter French, pp.233-250, 
Rochester, Vermont, Schenkman Books. 
 76 
 Corlett Angelo (2001) „Collective Moral Responsibility‟. Journal of Social 
Philosophy, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 573-584. 
 Csete Joanne (2002) „Democratic Republic of Congo. The war Within the 
War. Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in eastern Congo‟. New 
York, Human Rights Watch. 
 Cumming Sheonaidh Marie (2003) “Can States Care? Institutional Moral 
Agency and an Ethics of Care”. MScEcon Thesis. Department of 
International Politics, University of Wales, Aberyswyth. 
 Cuvelier Jeroen and Raeymaekers (2002) „Network war. An Introduction to 
Congo‟s Privatized Economy‟. An International Peace and Information 
Service Report, Antwerp. 
 Daley Patricia (2006) „Challenges to Peace: Conflict Resolution in the 
Great Lakes Region of Africa‟, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 
303-319. 
 De Villers Gauthier and Tshonda Omasombo Jean (2002) „An Intransitive 
Transition‟, Review of African Political Economy, No. 93/94, pp. 399-410. 
 Dobson Andrew (2006) „Thick Cosmopolitanism‟. Political Institutions, Vol. 
54, pp. 165-184. 
 Donald Dominick (2002) „Neutrality, Impartiality and UN Peacekeeping at 
the Beginning of the 21st Century‟, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 9, No. 
4, pp. 21-38. 
 Dunn Kevin (2003) Imagining the Congo: The International relations of 
Identity. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan. 
 Durch J Williams, Holt K. Victoria, Earle R Caroline, and Shanahan K. 
Moira (2003) „The Brahimi Report and the Future of Peace Operations‟. 
Washington, the Henry L. Stimson Center. 
 Du Plessis Max and Pete Stephen (2004) „Who Guards the Guards? The 
ICC and serious Crimes Committed by United Nations Peacekeepers in 
Africa‟, African Security Review, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 5-17. 
 Economist Intelligence Unit (December 2003) Country Report: Democratic 
Republic of Congo, London. 
 Economist Intelligence Unit (December 2004) Country Report: Democratic 
Republic of Congo, London. 
 77 
 Economist (12/03/2005) „The UN gets tougher; Democratic Republic of 
Congo‟, Vol. 374, Iss. 8417, p. 67. 
 Economist Intelligence Unit (March, 2005) Country Report: Democratic 
Republic of Congo, London. 
 Economist (4/02/2006) „Worries in the east; Congo‟, Vol. 378, Iss. 8463, 
p. 55. 
 Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) (March 16, 2006) „Congo Politics: 
Another Modern Tragedy‟, New York. 
 Economist Intelligence Unit (17/03/2006) „Congo (Democratic 
Republic)/Uganda Politics: ICJ Rules against Uganda‟. 
 Elbe Stefan (2002) „HIV/AIDS and the Changing Landscape of War in 
Africa‟, International Security, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 159-177. 
 Emizet N. F. Kisangani (2000) „The massacre of refugees in Congo: A case 
of UN Peacekeeping failure and International Law‟, The journal of Modern 
African Studies, vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 163-202. 
 Emizet F. Kisangani (2006) „Legacies of war Economy: Economic 
challenges for Postconflict Reconstruction‟. In The Democratic Republic of 
Congo. Economic dimensions of War and Peace, Edited by Nest Michael, 
Grignon Francois and Kisangani Emizet, pp. 99-129, (International Peace 
Academy Occasional Paper series) London, Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 Erskine Toni (2003a) „Introduction. Making Sense of „Responsibility‟. In 
International Relations: Key Questions and Concepts‟. Can Institutions 
have Responsibilities? Collective and Moral Agency, Edited by Toni 
Erskine, pp. 1-18, Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan. 
 Erskine Toni (2003b) „Assigning Responsibilities to Institutional Moral 
Agents: The Case of States and „Quasi-States‟”, In Can Institutions Have 
Responsibilities? Collective Agency and International Relations, Edited by 
Erskine Toni, pp. 19-40, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan. 
 Erskine Toni (2004) „”Blood on UN‟s hands”? Assigning Duties and 
Apportioning Blame to an Intergovernmental Organization‟. Global 
Society, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 21-42. 
 Feinberg Joel (1962) „Problematic Responsibility in Law and Morals‟. In 
The Philosophical Review, Vol. 71, No. 3, pp. 340-351. 
 78 
 Feinberg Joel (1968) “Collective Responsibility”. The Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 65, No. 21, pp. 674-688. 
 Fischer Joan Martin and Ravizza Mark (1998) Responsibility and Control: 
a Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 Flores Albert and Johnson G. Deborah (1983) „Collective responsibility 
and Professional Roles‟. Ethics, pp. 537-545. 
 French Peter (1995) Corporate Ethics. Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College 
Publishers. 
 French Peter (1998a) „Collective Responsibility‟. In Individual and 
Collective Responsibility. Edited by French Peter, pp. 51-76, Rochester, 
Schenkman Books. 
 French Peter (1998b) „The Responsibility of Inactive Fictive Groups for 
Great Social Problems‟. In Individual and Collective Responsibility. Edited 
by French Peter, pp. 251-259, Rochester, Schenkman Books 
 Ginifer Jeremy (2002) „Peacebuilding in the Congo: Mission Impossible?‟, 
International Peacekeeping, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 121-128. 
 Global Witness (2005) Under-Mining Peace. Tin: The Explosive Trade in 
Cassiterite in Eastern DRC. A Report by Global Witness. June 2005. 
 Grignon Francois (2003) „International Response to the Illegal 
Exploitation of Resources in the DRC‟. In Challenges to Peace 
Implementation. The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Editors Malan Mark and Porto J. Gomes, pp. 43-52. Pretoria, Institute of 
Security Studies. Also available at: www.iss.org.za 
 Grignon Francois (2006) Economic Agendas in the Congolese Peace 
Process. In The democratic republic of Congo. Economic Dimensions of War 
and Peace, edited by Nest Michael, Grignon Francois and Emizet 
Kisangani, pp. 63-98, London, Lynne Rienner. 
 Goodpaster E. Kenneth and Matthews John B. jr. (1982) „Can a 
Corporation Have a Conscience?‟. Harvard Business Review, January-
February, pp. 132-141. 
 Harbour V. Frances (2003) „Collective Moral Agency and the Political 
Process‟. In Can Institutions Have Responsibilities? Collective Agency and 
 79 
International Relations, Edited by Erskine Toni, pp.69-83, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 Hart H. L. A. and Honore Tony (1985) Causation in the Law. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press. 
 Haskin M. Jeanne (2005) The Tragic state of Congo. From Decolonization 
to Dictatorship. New York, Algora Publishing. 
 Held Virginia (1970) „Can a random Collection of Individuals be Morally 
Responsible?‟. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 67, No. 14, pp. 471-481. 
 Higate Paul (2004) Gender and Peacekeeping. Case-Studies: The DRC and 
Sierra Leone. Institution for Security Studies Monograph No 91. Also 
available online at: www.iss.org.za 
 Hix Simon (2005) The Political System of the European Union, 2nd edition, 
Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan. 
 Human Rights Watch (2005) The Curse of Gold. Democratic Republic of 
Congo. A Report by Human Rights Watch, New York. Available at: 
www.hrw.org 
 Huliaras C. Asteris (1998) „The “Anglosaxon Conspiracy”: French 
Perceptions of the Great Lakes Crisis‟, The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, Vol. 36, No.4, pp.  593-604. 
 Inis L. Claude Jr (1966) „Colective Legitimization as a Political Function 
of the United Nations‟. International Organization, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 367-
379. Also available at: www.icg.org 
 International Crisis Group (ICG) (1999) Africa‟s Seven-Nation War. ICG 
Democratic republic of Congo Report No 4 (21 May 1999). Also available 
at: www.icg.org 
 International Crisis Group (ICG) (2000) „Scramble for the Congo. Anatomy 
of an Ugly War‟. ICG Africa report No 26, Nairobi, Brussels. Also available 
at: www.icg.org 
 International Crisis Group (ICG) (2003) „The Kivus: The Forgotten Crucible 
of the Congo Conflict‟. Africa Report No 56, Nairobi, Brussels (24 January 
2003). 
 80 
 Jackson Stephen 92002) „Making a Killing: Criminality and Coping in the 
Kivu War Economy‟, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 93/94, 
pp.517-536.  
 Kassa Michel (2003) „Humanitarian Assistance in the DRC‟. In 
Challenges to Peace Implementation. The UN Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Editors Malan Mark and Porto J. Gomes, pp. 81-
87. Pretoria, Institute of Security Studies. Also available at: 
www.iss.org.za 
 Kennes Erik (2002) „Footnotes to the Mining Story‟, Review of African 
Political Economy, Vol. 93/94, pp. 601-606. 
 Kroslak Daniela (2002) „The Responsibility of External Bystanders in 
Cases of Genocide: The French in Rwanda, 1990-1994‟, PhD Thesis, 
department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth. 
 Kroslak Daniela (2003) „The Responsibility of Collective External 
Bystanders in cases of Genocide: The French in Rwanda‟. In 
International Relations: Key Questions and Concepts‟. Can Institutions 
have Responsibilities? Collective and Moral Agency, Edited by Toni 
Erskine, pp.159-182, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan. 
 Lang Anthony Jr. (2003) „The United Nations and the Fall of Srebrenica: 
Meaningful Responsibility and International Society‟. In Can Institutions 
Have Responsibilities? Collective Agency and International Relations, 
Edited by Erskine Toni, pp.183-206, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan. 
 Lemarchand Rene (2000) „Exclusion, Marginalization and Political 
Mobilization. The Road to Hell in the Great Lakes‟. Occasional Papers 
(March 2000) Copenhagen Center of African Studies. Available at: 
www.teol.ku.dk 
 Lemarchand Rene (2002) „The tunnel at the End of the Light‟, Review of 
African Political Economy, No. 93/94, pp. 389-398. 
 Lischer Kenyon Sarah (2005) „Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, 
Civil war, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid‟, Cornell, Cornell 
University Press. 
 List Christian and Pettit Philip (2006) „Group Agency and Supervinience‟. 
Southern Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming, Available: 
 81 
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/LIST/PDF-
files/GroupAgencySupervenience/pdf. 
 Loescher Gil (2004) Refugee Protection and State Security: Towards a 
Greater Convergence. In The United Nations and Global Security, Edited 
by Price M. Richard and Zacher W. Mark, pp. 160-175. New York, 
Houndmills: Palgrave, Macmillan. 
 Mack Andrew and Furlong Kathryn (2004) when Aspiration exceeds 
Capability: the UN and Conflict Prevention. In The United Nations and 
Global Security, Edited by Price M. Richard and Zacher W. Mark, pp. 59-
73. New York, Houndmills: Palgrave, Macmillan. 
 Majone Giandomenico (2001) „Two Logics of Delegation. Agency and 
Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance‟. European Union Politics, Vol. 2, 
No. 1, pp. 103-122. 
 Malan Mark and Porto Gomez Joao (2003) „Introduction‟. In Challenges to 
Peace Implementation. The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Editors Malan Mark and Porto J. Gomes, Pretoria, Institute of 
Security Studies. Also available at: www.iss.org.za 
 Mansson Katarina (2005) „Use of Force and Civilian Protection: Peace 
Operations in the Congo‟, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 
503-519. 
 May Larry and Hoffman Stacey (1991) „Introduction‟. In Collective 
Responsibility. Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics. 
Edited by May Larry and Hoffman Stacey, pp. 1-16, Maryland, Rowman 
and Littlefiled Publishers. 
 May Larry (1998) „Collective Inaction and Responsibility‟. In Individual 
and Collective Responsibility, edited by Peter French, pp. 211-232, 
Rochester, Vermont, Schenkman Books. 
 McCalpin O. Jermaine (2002) „Historicity of a Crisis. The Origins of the 
Congo War‟. In The African Stakes of the Congo War, edited by Clark E. 
John, pp. 33-50, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan. 
 Megret Frederic and Hoffmann Florian (2003) „The Un as a Human 
Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the United Nations Changing 
 82 
Human Rights responsibilities‟. Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 24, pp. 
314-342. 
 Melvern Linda (2000) A People Betrayed. The Role of the west in 
Rwanda‟s Genocide. London, New York, Zed Books. 
 Miller David (2001) „Distributing Responsibilities‟. The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 453-471. 
 Montaque Dena (2002) „Stolen Goods: Coltan and Conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo‟, SAIS Review, vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 103-118. 
 Muchai Augusta (2002) „Arms Proliferation in the Congo War‟. In The 
African Stakes of the Congo War, edited by Clark E. John, pp.185-199, 
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan. 
 Murison Jude (2002) „The Politics of Refugees and Internally Displaced 
Persons in the Congo War‟, In The African Stakes of the Congo War, 
edited by Clark E. John, pp. 225-237, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 Ndikumana Leonce and Emizet Kisangani (2003) „The Economics of Civil 
War: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo”. Political Economy 
Research Institute (PERI), Working Papers, No. 63. 
 Nest Michael (2001) „Ambitions, Profits and Loss: Zimbabwean Economic 
Involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo‟, African Affairs, Vol. 
100, pp. 469-490. 
 Nest Michael, Grignon Francois and Kisangani F. Emizet (2006) The 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Economic Dimensions of war and Peace. 
(International Peace Academy Occasional Paper series). London, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers. 
 Nzongola-Ndalaja Georges (2004) „From Zaire to Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Current African Issues, Paper No. 28, Nordiska 
Afrikainstituten, Upssala. 
 Olsson Ola and Fors Congdon Heather (2004) „Congo: The Prize of 
Predation‟, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 321-336. 
 Pollack A. Mark (1997) „Delegation, Agency and Agenda Setting in the 
European Community‟. International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 99-
134. 
 83 
 Polman Linda (2003) We Did Nothing. Why the Truth doesn‟t always come 
out when the UN goes in. London, Penguin-Viking.  
 Prunier Gerard (1997) „The Great Lakes Crisis‟, Current History, Vol. 96, 
No. 610, pp. 193-199. 
 Reytjens Filip (1999) „The Second Congo War: More than a Remake‟, 
African Affairs, Vol. 98, No. 391, pp. 241-250. 
 Ricci Roberto (2003) „Human rights Challenges in the DRC: A View form 
MONUC‟s Human Rights Section‟. In Challenges to Peace Implementation. 
The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Editors Malan 
Mark and Porto J. Gomes, pp. 97-102, Pretoria, Institute of Security 
Studies. Also available at: www.iss.org.za 
 Robinson Simon and Walt Vivienne (2006) „The Deadliest Conflict in the 
World‟, TIME Magazine, Vol. 167, No. 23, pp. 32-35. 
 Rogier Emeric (2003) „The Labyrinth Path to Peace in the democratic 
Republic of Congo‟. In The Peace Process in the DRC. A Reader. A 
Publication of the African Security Analysis Program at the Institute of 
Security Studies (ISS). Also available at: www.iss.org.za 
 Rosenblum Peter (1997) „Endgame in Zaire‟, Current History, Vol. 96, No. 
610, pp. 200-205. 
 Rupyia Martin (2005) „UN Panel of Experts. A Peace-Building Tool?‟, 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Paper No 122. Available at: 
www.iss.org.za 
 Samset Ingrid (2002) „Conflict of Interests or Interests of Conflict? 
Diamonds and war in the DRC‟, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 
93/94, pp.463-480. 
 Saskia Trefon Theodore, Van Hoyweghen and Smis Stefaan (2002) „State 
Failure in the Congo: Perceptions and Realities‟, Review of African 
Political Economy, No. 93/94, pp. 379-388. 
 Sens G. Allen (2004) „From Peace-Keeping to Peace-Building: The United 
Nations and the Challenge of Intrastate War‟. In The United Nations and 
Global Security, Edited by Price M. Richard and Zacher W. Mark, pp.141-
159. New York, Houndmills: Palgrave, Macmillan. 
 84 
 Shearer David (1999) „Africa‟s Great War‟, Survival, Vol.41, No. 2, pp. 89-
106. 
 Shearer David (2000) Aiding or Abetting? Humanitarian Aid and its 
Economic Role in Civil War. In Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas 
in Civil Wars, edited by Berdal Mats and Malone M. David, Boulder, 
London, Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 Slim Hugo (1997) „Doing the Right Thing: Relief Agencies, Moral 
Dilemmas and Moral responsibility in Political Emergencies and War‟, 
Disasters, Vol. 21, No 3, pp. 244-257. 
 Smis Stefaan and Oyatambwe Wamu (2002) „Complex Political 
emergencies, the International Community and the Congo Conflict‟, 
Review of African Political Economy, No. 93/94, pp. 411-430. 
 Stockton Nicholas (1998) „In Defense of Humanitarianism‟, Disasters, 
Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 352-360. 
 Sullivan Earl (1999) The United Nations: Dealing with Threats to the 
Peace in the Post-Cold war Era. In Multilateral Diplomacy and the United 
Nations Today, edited by Muldoon James Jr, Aviel Fagot Joann, Reitano 
Richard and Sullivan Earl, pp. 43-54. Colorado, Westview Press. 
 Swarbrick Peter (2003) DDRRR Political Dynamics and Linkages. In 
Challenges to Peace Implementation. The UN Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Editors Malan Mark and Porto J. Gomes, pp. 81-
87. Pretoria, Institute of Security Studies. Also available at: 
www.iss.org.za 
 Tallberg Jonas (2002) „Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, 
How and with What Consequences?‟. West European Politics, Vol. 25, No. 
1, pp. 23-46. 
 Thajur Ramesh (2004) Developing Countries and the Intervention-
Sovereignty Debate. In The United Nations and Global Security, Edited by 
Price M. Richard and Zacher W. Mark, pp. 193-207. New York, 
Houndmills: Palgrave, Macmillan. 
 Thompson Alex (2000) An Introduction to African Politics. London, 
Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group. 
 85 
 Tshitereke Clarence (2003) „On the Origins of war in Africa‟, African 
Security Review, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 81-90. 
 USIP (2001) AIDS and Violent Conflict in Africa. Special report by the 
United States Institute of Peace, October 15, 2001. Available at: 
www.usip.org. 
 Van Brabant Koenraad (2001) „Understanding, Promoting and evaluating 
Coordination: An Outline Framework‟. In Aspects of Peacekeeping, Edited 
by Gordon D. S. and Toase F. H., pp.141-161, London, Frank Cass. 
 Vlassenroot Kohen and Raeymaekers Timothy (2005) „The Formation of 
the Centres of Profit, Power and Protection. Conflict and Social 
Transformation in the Eastern DR Congo. Occasional Paper, Center of 
African Studies, University of Copenhagen. 
 Walsh W. H. (1970) „Pride, Shame and Responsibility‟. The Philosophical 
Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 78, pp. 1-13. 
 Walzer Michael (1977) Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with 
Historical Illustrations, New York, Basic Books. 
 Watchlist (2003) „The impact of Armed Conflict on Children in the 
democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)‟. New York, Watchlist on children and 
Armed Conflicts. Also available at: www.watchlist.org 
 Watchlist  (2006). „Struggling to Survive: Children in Armed Conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo‟ New York, Watchlist on children and 
Armed Conflicts. Also available at: www.watchlist.org 
 Wheeler J. Nicholas (2000) Saving Strangers Humanitarian Intervention in 
International Society. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 Wrong Michela (08/05/2006) „Congo on the Edge‟, New Statesman, Vol. 
19, Iss. 910, pp 26-27. 
 Wolff Stefan (2005) Ethnic Conflict. A Global Perspective. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
 Yorke Edmund (2001) Regional Initiatives and Non-UN Forms of 
Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Aspects of Peacekeeping, Edited 
by Gordon D. S. and Toase F. H., pp. 78-97, London, Frank Cass. 
 Young Crowford (2002) „Contextualizing Congo Conflicts. Order and 
Disorder in Postcolonial Africa‟. In The African Stakes of the Congo War, 
 86 
edited by Clark E. John, pp. 13-31, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 Zimmerman J. Michael (1997) „Moral Responsibility and Ignorance‟. 
Ethics, Vol. 107, No. 3, pp. 410-426. 
 
 
UN Documents 
 UN Security Council Resolution 929 (1994), S/RES/929, 22 June 1994. 
 UN Document S/1999/790 (1999) „Report of the Secretary-General on the 
United Nations Deployment in the Democratic Republic of Congo‟, 15 July 
1999. 
 UN Document S/2000/30 (2000) „Report of the Secretary General on the 
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo‟, 17 January 2000. 
 UN Security Council Resolution 1291 (2000), S/RES/1291 (2000), 24 
February 2000. 
 UN Security Council Resolution 1376 (2001), S/RES/1376 (2001), 9 
November 2001. 
 UN Document S/2002/1146 (2002) „Lettre du 15 Octobre 2002, 
addressee au President du Conseil du Securite par le Secretaire General‟, 
16 Octobre 2002. 
 UN Security Council Resolution 1493 (2003), S/RES/1493 (2003), 28 
July, 2003. 
 UN Document S/2003/1027 (2003) „Letter dated 23 October from the 
Secretary General, addressed to the President of the Security Council‟, 23 
October, 2003. 
 UN Document S/2004/650 (2004), „Third Special Report of the Secretary 
General on the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo‟, 16 August 2004. 
 UN Security Council Resolution 1565 (2004), S/RES/1565 (2004), 1 
October, 2004. 
 UN Document S/2005/30 (2005), „Letter dated 25 January 2005 from the 
Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to 
 87 
resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
addressed to the President of the Security Council ‟, 25 January, 2005. 
 UN Document S/2005/436 (2005), „Letter dated 26 July 2005 from the 
Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to 
resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
addressed to the President of the Security Council‟, 26 July, 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 88 
Abbreviation List 
AFDL                                         Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour 
                                                  la Liberation du Congo (Kabila‟s Rebel  
                                                  group: 1996-1997). 
DRC                       Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
FAR                                           Rwandan Armed Forces (Former       
                                                 Rwandan Armed Froces that took part 
                                                  in the Rwandan Genocide-1994). 
FAZ                                            Forces Armees Zairoises (Mobutu  
                                                  regime‟s military). 
ICJ                                            International Court of Justice 
JMC                                           Joint Military Commission (The  
                                                  designated from Lusaka Ceasefire  
                                                  Agreement to observe the disengagement plan    
                                                  and the             cease-fire). 
MLC                                           Movement for the Liberation of  
                                                  the Congo (Ugandan-backed rebel group) 
MONUC                                     Mission de l‟ Organization des Nations 
                                                  Unies en Republique Democratique du  
                                                  Congo. 
RCD                                           Rassemblement Congolais pour la  
                                                  Democratie (or the Congolese Rally for  
                                                  Democracy). 
RPA                                            Rwandan Patriotic Army (The Army of  
                                                  Rwanda). 
UN             United Nations. 
UNHCR                                     United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNSC                                        United Nations Security Council 
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